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Does the existing anti-manipulation framework effectively deter 
algorithmic manipulation? With the dual increase of algorithmic trading and 
the occurrence of “mini-flash crashes” in the market linked to manipulation, 
this question has become more pressing in recent years. In the past thirty years, 
the financial markets have undergone a sea change as technological 
advancements and innovations have fundamentally altered the structure and 
operation of the markets. Key to this change is the introduction and dominance 
of trading algorithms. Whereas initial algorithmic trading relied on preset 
electronic instructions to execute trading strategies, new technology is 
introducing artificially intelligent (“AI”) trading algorithms that learn 
dynamically from data and respond intuitively to market changes. These 
technological developments have exposed significant shortcomings in the 
effectiveness of anti-manipulation laws, particularly regarding one of their 
fundamental goals: deterring market manipulation.  
Preventing manipulation remains a key feature of the legal regime 
governing the financial markets. Rampant manipulation undermines the 
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viability of the market and, in the case of algorithmic manipulation, increases 
systemic risks within the market. Deterring algorithmic manipulation is thus 
essential to the viability and stability of the market. But credible and effective 
deterrence of wrongdoing requires certainty of punishment, which is 
increasingly unattainable with respect to algorithmic manipulation under the 
existing legal regime. Specifically, the law of manipulation tethers liability to 
scienter, which algorithms cannot legally form. Further, deciphering the intent 
of the human behind the algorithm can be a near-impossible task in all but the 
most egregious cases. The scienter-focused nature of the anti-manipulation 
framework therefore diminishes the disciplinary power of the law, weakening 
deterrence and incentivizing algorithmic manipulation.  
This Article demonstrates that the scienter-centric analysis 
undergirding anti-manipulation laws creates gaps in the detection and 
punishment of algorithmic manipulation that weaken the current legal regime’s 
deterrent effect. The acute failure of the law to punish algorithmic manipulation 
incentivizes potential wrongdoers to utilize algorithms to cloak their misdeeds, 
exposing the markets to significant systemic harm. Notably, unlike other 
scholars and policymakers that view transparency as the ultimate solution to 
increase accountability for algorithms, this Article highlights the potential 
limitations of relying primarily on transparency. Rather, the Article urges 
changes to the legal framework to modernize its applicability: eschew the 
scienter requirement and, instead, focus on the resulting harm of the algorithm 
on the market. Together, these proposals are likely to credibly deter algorithmic 
manipulation, safeguarding the viability, efficiency, and stability of 
the markets.  
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INTRODUCTION 
To state the obvious: human traders are no longer at the 
epicenter of the financial markets. Computers running algorithmic 
trading programs have taken over as the primary “traders” in the 
market, while humans execute merely ten percent of all trades today.1 
Algorithmic trading can be categorized broadly as either preset 
algorithms or artificial intelligence (“AI”) algorithms. Preset algorithms 
rely on programmed instructions to execute a specified trading strategy. 
These algorithms respond to new data and change their strategies 
within determined parameters, operating according to precise 
 
 1. Evelyn Cheng, Just 10% of Trading Is Regular Stock Picking, JPMorgan Estimates, 
CNBC (June 13, 2017, 4:49 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/13/death-of-the-human-investor-
just-10-percent-of-trading-is-regular-stock-picking-jpmorgan-estimates.html [https://perma.cc/ 
DXZ3-YAFJ]. 
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electronic commands. AI algorithms, on the other hand, differ 
meaningfully from preset algorithms—they are tasked with 
accomplishing a goal and left to figure out the best way to do it. AI 
algorithms learn from prior decisions, dynamically assess new 
information, and optimize their solutions to reflect new data.2 Both 
forms of algorithmic trading programs are well suited for the financial 
markets because of their capacity to analyze large swaths of data and 
to execute complex trading strategies, responding almost 
instantaneously to new information and changed market conditions.3  
In the past thirty years, algorithmic trading has come to 
dominate the financial markets, and algorithms are involved in almost 
every aspect of trading today. The dominance of algorithmic trading has 
resulted in significant benefits, including lowered trading costs, greater 
market accessibility, faster trade execution, and greater market 
efficiency and liquidity.4 Notwithstanding these benefits, algorithms 
also make it easier for would-be manipulators to distort the markets, 
with potentially disastrous consequences, and cloak their misdeeds to 
avoid detection and punishment. For example, in 2010, the Dow Jones 
Index experienced one of the largest single-day drops in history because 
of the efforts of a trader to create fake buy-sell orders using an 
algorithmic trading program that went haywire.5 The “2010 Flash 
Crash” roiled the markets for less than a half hour and yet resulted in 
billions of dollars of losses in market capitalization for companies and 
in investor funds.6 Since then, mini-flash crashes have become more 
commonplace, spurred to a large extent by the prevalence of algorithmic 
trading and exacerbated by the use of algorithms to distort and deceive 
 
 2. See, e.g., Michael J. McGowan, iBrief, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: 
Use and Controversy, 9 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 2010, ¶ 2 (discussing how high frequency (“HF”) 
trading firms use algorithms to make assumptions about the market and trade stocks  
in milliseconds). 
 3. See id. ¶¶ 15–18. 
 4. See Rajan Lakshmi A. & Vedala Naga Sailaja, Survey of Algorithmic Trading Strategies 
in Equities and Derivatives, 8 INT’L J. MECH. ENG’G & TECH. 817, 821 (2017) (describing the 
positive market impacts of algorithmic and high-frequency trading). 
 5. Jill Treanor, The 2010 ‘Flash Crash’: How It Unfolded, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2015,  
1:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/22/2010-flash-crash-new-york-stock-
exchange-unfolded [https://perma.cc/542L-JMHV]:  
In a matter of minutes the Dow Jones index lost almost 9% of its value – in a sequence[ ] 
of events that quickly became known as “flash crash” . . . . [O]fficials in the US [blamed 
the crash on] big bets by a trader on Chicago’s derivatives exchange. . . . [A] mutual 
fund had used an automated algorithm trading strategy to sell contracts known as e-
minis. It was the largest change in the daily position of any investor so far that year 
and sparked selling by other traders, including high frequency traders. 
 6. Id. 
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the markets.7 In the past five years, both the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”) (collectively, the “Commissions”) have increased their 
enforcement actions for market manipulation, many involving 
algorithmic trading, but with mixed results.8  
The prevention of market manipulation was, and remains, a key 
feature of the laws governing the securities and commodities markets.9 
Rampant and unfettered market manipulation threatens the viability 
of the financial markets, thereby making the deterrence of market 
manipulation foundational to the markets’ survival.10 The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and the Commodity Exchange 
Act of 1936 (“CEA”) (collectively, the “Acts”), which govern the 
securities and commodities markets respectively, provide the legal anti-
manipulation framework applicable to the financial markets.11 
Importantly, under both Acts, liability for market manipulation hinges 
on proving that the accused acted with scienter—that is, intentionally 
or recklessly—in distorting the market. Historically, the emphasis on 
scienter has proven to be a difficult hurdle for regulators to overcome in 
enforcing anti-manipulation laws against human traders.12 These 
challenges are only further exacerbated in algorithm-dominated 
markets, as scienter becomes more difficult to identify, decreasing the 
likelihood that the existing legal framework can detect and punish 
market manipulation.13 
The recurrence of algorithm-related market distortion coupled 
with inconsistent regulatory enforcements against such misconduct 
raise questions about the capacity of the anti-manipulation legal 
framework to achieve one of its most fundamental tasks: deterring 
market manipulation. In today’s markets, credibly deterring market 
 
 7. Alexander Munk & Erhan Bayraktar, Opinion: The Stock Market Has About 12  
Mini Flash Crashes a Day — and We Can’t Prevent Them, MARKETWATCH (July 31, 2017, 12:47 
PM ET), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-stock-market-has-about-12-mini-flash-crashes-
a-day-and-we-cant-prevent-them-2017-07-31 [https://perma.cc/85Y3-936H]. 
 8. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Legitimate Yet Manipulative: The Conundrum of Open-Market 
Manipulation, 68 DUKE L.J. 479, 484 (2018). 
 9. Id. at 488 (“Preventing market manipulation was one of the initial motivators behind the 
adoption of the securities and commodities laws.”). 
 10. See id. at 488–90 (explaining the far-reaching consequences of market manipulation).  
 11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq; Commodity Exchange Act of 
1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27f.  
 12. E.g., DiPlacido v. CFTC, 364 F. App’x 657 (2d Cir. 2009). DiPlacido was the CFTC’s first 
court win against price manipulation. See id.; see also Fletcher, supra note 8, at 501 (discussing 
the difficulty the SEC and the CFTC have historically had in successfully bringing price 
manipulation claims). 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 659 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (discussing the 
challenge of proving intent in a spoofing case, as legitimate trading and spoofing are both 
intentional acts). 
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manipulation is both a practical and philosophical issue that strains—
and will continue to strain—the boundaries of how the legal framework 
defines and conceptualizes punishable misconduct in an increasingly 
algorithm-dominated market. The inability of the legal regime to 
credibly deter algorithm-related manipulation poses significant 
challenges for the efficacy of the legal framework, the reputation of the 
regulators, and the viability of the market. This Article grapples with 
the questions that arise when laws intended for humans are applied to 
algorithms and the consequences of the resulting mismatch.  
This Article demonstrates that the application of existing anti-
manipulation laws and regulations to algorithmic trading is ineffectual 
in holding anyone accountable for an algorithm’s manipulative 
behavior. The law’s emphasis on scienter to assign liability weakens the 
disciplinary power of the legal framework, which is only worsened with 
algorithms because scienter is easily obscured. With preset algorithms 
and in “easy cases,” the intent of the programmer can be evident from 
the code and the paper trail left behind by the algorithm. In such cases, 
regulators can identify the programmer’s manipulative intent and hold 
her liable for the algorithm’s misconduct.14  
In more complex cases, however, as when the algorithm distorts 
the market using facially legitimate transactions, determining the 
necessary scienter to hold the human behind the algorithm liable for 
manipulation becomes a difficult and near-impossible undertaking. The 
exercise becomes all the more challenging when AI algorithms 
employing machine learning are considered. In learning and problem-
solving, there is no human involvement in the algorithm’s 
decisionmaking, and, as such, any decision made is attributable to the 
algorithm exclusively.15  
Legally, algorithms cannot have intent, which then raises the 
question: How does the law address manipulative behavior of an 
algorithm, both preset and AI-based? The traditional limitations of 
anti-manipulation laws, which place a heavy evidentiary burden on 
proving a trader’s manipulative intent, are brought into sharp relief in 
algorithmic markets. Even in the absence of algorithms, proving a 
trader’s mental state has always been difficult;16 with the involvement 
 
 14. See, e.g., Amanat v. SEC, 269 F. App’x 217 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 15. For an example of the analytical and strategic capabilities of AI, especially AI’s potential 
to outperform human competitors in an environment that requires quick, complex analysis, see 
Kelsey Piper, Starcraft Is a Deep, Complicated War Strategy Game. Google’s Alphastar AI Crushed 
It., VOX, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/1/24/18196177/ai-artificial-intelligence-google-
deepmind-starcraft-game (last updated Jan. 24, 2019, 7:04 PM EST) [https://perma.cc/385A-
YGR3].  
 16. See Fletcher, supra note 8, at 515 (noting the “inherent difficulty” of proving intent, 
particularly because “direct evidence of a defendant’s manipulative intent [is rarely] available”). 
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of algorithms, it may be almost impossible in the absence of a 
metaphorical “smoking gun.” Rather than credibly identifying and 
punishing algorithm-related manipulation, the scienter requirement 
reduces the disciplinary power of the anti-manipulation laws, 
concomitantly weakening the regime’s deterrent effect. Fundamentally, 
there is a mismatch between the legal requirements to punish 
manipulation that require proving scienter and the realities of 
algorithmic design in which the intent of the programmer can be 
obscure or undecipherable. This incongruence undermines the capacity 
of the law to identify, detect, and effectively punish algorithm-related 
manipulation—all important factors in credible deterrence.  
Under the theory of deterrence, credible and effective deterrence 
depends on certainty and severity of punishment for wrongdoing—the 
higher the likelihood of punishment and the greater the severity of 
punishment for misconduct, the more effective the liability framework 
in achieving deterrence. To date, regulators have focused primarily on 
increasing the severity of punishment to achieve deterrence. Fines and 
penalties for manipulation, particularly algorithm-related 
manipulation, have increased significantly over the past decade.17 
Similarly, there has been a notable expansion in criminal prosecutions 
for manipulation.18 But, as research has shown, increasing the severity 
of sanctions is an unproductive approach to deterring misconduct if 
punishment is uncertain.19 This Article demonstrates that, in all but 
the most egregious cases, the existing anti-manipulation framework’s 
scienter requirement increases the difficulty of proving manipulation, 
makes enforcement uncertain and unequal across markets, and results 
in dissimilar liability for similar harm.20  
To respond to the lack of accountability of algorithms, scholars 
and policymakers have often proposed improving the transparency  
and explainability of algorithms.21 More transparent, explainable 
algorithms are less likely to be misused and, to the extent they are, it 
 
 17. See DIV. OF ENF’T, SEC, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/ 
enforcement-annual-report-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY6Z-T2BN] (noting increases in the 
number of actions filed by the SEC and monetary relief awarded in enforcement actions); Press 
Release, CFTC, CFTC Division of Enforcement Issues Annual Report for FY 2019 (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8085-19 [https://perma.cc/KG7H-TUWR] (same, 
for the CFTC). 
 18. See infra Section II.C.1; see also sources cited supra note 17 (noting increased cooperation 
between financial regulators and criminal authorities).  
 19. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate 
Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507, 518–27 (2018) (discussing the insufficiencies of deterrence-
based punishments in a corporate context). 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Section IV.A. Please note, the terms transparent and explainable are synonyms 
in this context.  
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is easier for regulators to hold the human behind the algorithm liable 
for the effects of the algorithm’s conduct and decisionmaking.22 
Regulators and academics, therefore, believe that being able to “see 
into” the algorithm is the best response to minimizing the potential for 
misconduct and, ultimately, deterring manipulative activity. While this 
Article recognizes the promise and potential of enhanced transparency, 
it highlights the inadequacy of relying exclusively on explainability as 
a panacea for the shortcomings of the legal framework in deterring 
algorithm-related manipulation. 
This Article, therefore, proposes eliminating scienter from the 
anti-manipulation framework’s requirements and, instead, advocates 
focusing on how the transaction harms the market in determining 
liability for algorithm-related manipulation. A harm-focused 
framework would eliminate the uncertainty that accompanies proving 
scienter, enabling regulators to more effectively punish manipulators. 
By increasing the efficacy of the legal regime in holding manipulators 
accountable for the misconduct of their algorithms, a harm-based 
liability regime would emphasize certainty of punishment, enhancing 
its potential deterrent effect. Additionally, this Article proposes 
harmonized regulatory oversight of algorithmic trading to minimize the 
gaps between the SEC’s and the CFTC’s approach to algorithms. The 
disjointed and inconsistent approach of the regulators results in 
dissimilar liability for similar conduct in related markets, diminishing 
the deterrent effect of the legal framework. Meaningful, consistent 
regulations applicable to algorithms are, therefore, key to credibly 
deterring algorithm-related market manipulation.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the theory of 
deterrence, emphasizing the limitations of severity in achieving 
deterrence and how uncertainty undermines deterrence. This Part also 
examines the importance of deterrence to regulating the financial 
markets. Part II turns its attention to the anti-manipulation framework 
and how algorithms are used in the modern marketplace. Specifically, 
this Part provides a primer on relevant anti-manipulation provisions 
that are most applicable to algorithm-related manipulation. Part II also 
describes algorithmic trading and AI machine-learning trading 
programs and analyzes the possible ways in which algorithm-related 
manipulation could manifest in the financial markets. Part III analyzes 
the mismatch between algorithmic trading and the scienter-focused 
anti-manipulation framework, demonstrating the various ways and 
extent to which the law engenders uncertainty and reduces deterrence. 
Part IV addresses the market implications of the legal regime’s  
 
 22. See infra Section IV.A. 
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failure to deter manipulation and explores potential pathways  
to minimize the uncertainty the law generates in punishing  
algorithm-related manipulation. 
I. THE THEORY OF DETERRENCE  
In the 1930s, the prevalence of manipulation and evidence of its 
rampant effects on the markets and investors propelled congressional 
action to regulate the financial markets and outlaw manipulation.23 
Today, despite the dramatic changes to the structure and operation of 
the financial markets, manipulation remains a common form of market 
misconduct and, indeed, the forms of manipulation have evolved 
alongside the markets.24 Consequently, deterring market manipulation 
continues to be a central focus for both the CFTC and the SEC, the 
primary financial market regulators.25  
This Part ties together the theory and reality of deterrence and 
provides foundational explanation and support for the importance of 
deterrence to the functioning of the financial markets. It begins with a 
discussion of deterrence theory, highlighting the importance of 
certainty and severity in deterring misconduct. Next, this Part 
examines the market benefits that arise from an effective manipulation 
deterrence regime.  
A. A Primer on Deterrence Theory  
Deterrence theory is a law and economics-based school of 
thought that posits a person will violate the law if her expected utility 
from the crime exceeds her disutility from not committing the crime.26 
That is, the theory presumes that a trader will weigh the costs and 
benefits of her conduct in deciding whether to engage in misconduct, 
 
 23. See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation”  
in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 503 (1991) (discussing the history of  
market regulations). 
 24. Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1287–93 (2017) 
(describing the new forms of market manipulation that emerged following the flash crashes). 
 25. See Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis, and Deterrence, 
31 ENERGY L.J. 1, 6 (2010) (“Several statutes proscribe manipulation of commodity markets. These 
include the CEA, which has as its purpose the prevention and deterrence of price 
manipulation . . . .”); Fletcher, supra note 8, at 488 (“Preventing market manipulation was one of 
the initial motivators behind the adoption of the securities and commodities laws.”).  
 26. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169 (1968) (proposing an economic framework for analyzing criminal punishment); see also A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 45, 47 (2000) (stating that a criminal will “commit the act if and only if his 
expected utility from doing so, taking into account his gain and the chance of his being caught and 
sanctioned, exceeds his utility if he does not commit the act”).  
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such as manipulation. If a scheme will result in penalties that exceed 
her gains, the trader will be deterred from engaging in the scheme. By 
adopting measures that increase the cost of violating the law, a 
deterrence-focused legal framework decreases the likelihood that a 
person will commit a crime.27 Thus, to deter market manipulation, the 
legal framework must focus on increasing the potential costs of 
manipulation to dissuade a would-be bad actor from engaging  
in misconduct.28 
Under deterrence theory, two primary factors potentially 
increase the costs a criminal faces: the certainty of punishment and the 
potential severity of sanctions.29 Certainty of punishment refers to the 
likelihood that the would-be perpetrator will suffer consequences for 
her crime.30 More than just the likelihood of getting caught, certainty 
incorporates several probabilities such as the possibility of detection, 
apprehension, conviction, and sanctions.31 Important to the assessment 
of certainty of punishment is the scope and substance of the legal 
regime. The legal framework must provide regulators with the 
necessary tools, resources, and authority to meaningfully address the 
misconduct.32 For example, if regulators lack the necessary resources or 
expertise to identify misconduct, the law’s deterrent effect is weakened. 
Likewise, if the applicable laws are narrow, only capturing the most 
 
 27. See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 783 (2010) (explaining deterrence with a utility equation).  
 28. See, e.g., Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be 
Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 16 (2011) (“The theory of deterrence is predicated on 
the idea that a sanction regime, by affecting the relative anticipated costs and benefits of a crime, 
can lead at least some members of a population to choose not to commit crime.”).  
 29. See Paternoster, supra note 27, at 776 (discussing the two main factors that inform 
deterrence theory). A third factor is usually included in the cost calculation—celerity (i.e., the 
swiftness with which punishment is meted out). See Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating 
Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory 
and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 865 (2006). But as deterrence theory has developed, certainty 
and severity have become the focus of regulators, academics, and policymakers. See, e.g., Yvonne 
M. Dutton, Crime and Punishment: Assessing Deterrence Theory in the Context of Somali Pirates, 
46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 607, 628 (2014) (“Scholars typically focus on two principal 
considerations that inform the calculation of costs with a well-enforced criminal justice system: 
the certainty of punishment and its likely severity.”). 
 30. Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of Globalization, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 505, 519 (2006). It should be noted here that certainty does not refer to the certainty 
(or uncertainty) that one’s actions constitute a crime.  
 31. Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295, 
1306 (2008).  
 32. See Lin, supra note 24, at 1303 (“[U]ntil new precedents, principles, and rules are firmly 
established, there will be significant enforcement challenges for regulators as they combat the new 
methods of market manipulation.”).   
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blatant misconduct, wrongdoers may not be deterred from breaking  
the law.33  
Also important to the effectiveness of deterrence is that the legal 
regime must clearly identify for the public when conduct is illegal. A 
legal framework that is overly broad or vague may obscure the legality 
of conduct, thereby impairing the ability of market actors to reasonably 
assess whether their conduct is permissible.34 Thus, on this prong, 
deterrence is effective if regulators have strong, suitable tools to enforce 
the regime and market actors know whether they are violating the law. 
The second consideration that increases the likelihood of 
deterrence is the potential severity of the sanctions. Severity refers to 
the length of sentences, the size of potential monetary fines, or the 
magnitude of any other sanctions that may be levied against a person 
for breaking the law.35 For example, it would be expected that a crime 
that carries a jail term may deter would-be criminals more than one 
that carries only a monetary fine. This highlights an important 
observation with respect to severity—to be effective at deterring, 
sanctions must be nuanced.36 That is, if sanctions are all equally high, 
individuals have little reason to engage in lesser crimes.37 Marginal 
deterrence responds to this issue by varying punishment based on the 
magnitude of the crime.38 Thus, to deter manipulation, the sanctions 
must be severe enough to increase the cost calculus of the manipulative 
scheme to the trader, but also graduated to reflect varying levels  
of seriousness.  
Early models of deterrence theory treated certainty and severity 
as the sole factors in achieving deterrence.39 Neoclassical models, 
 
 33. Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical 
Analysis, U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2185 (2010) (illustrating how a narrow fraud prohibition would fail 
to deter subtle forms of fraud, despite lowering related “overdeterrence costs”). 
 34. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with 
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984) (“If the legal standard is uncertain, even actors 
who behave ‘optimally’ in terms of overall social welfare will face some chance of being held liable 
because of the unpredictability of the legal rule.”).  
 35. Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199,  
203 (2013). 
 36. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 34, at 999–1000 (explaining that one approach to 
correct the distortions caused by uncertainty is to “promulgat[e] enforcement guidelines to make 
enforcement decisions more predictable”). 
 37. Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1245 (1985) (“[R]aising the sanction with the expected harmfulness of acts 
gives parties who are not [initially] deterred incentives to do less harm.”). 
 38. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 26, at 63 (“Deterrence of a more harmful act because 
its expected sanction exceeds that for a less harmful act is sometimes referred to as marginal 
deterrence.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 39. See Nagin, supra note 35, at 205–06 (“[O]ne of the greatest curbs on crime is not the 
[severity] of punishments, but their infallibility. . . . The certainty of punishment even if moderate 
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however, have expanded the theory’s focus to account for how individual 
behavior and subjective considerations may impact deterrence. First, 
deterrence depends on a would-be criminal’s subjective evaluation of 
risk.40 To the extent a criminal ignores or minimizes the risk of being 
caught, deterrence may be limited.41 Criminals may underestimate the 
risk of being caught because they are overconfident in their ability to 
avoid detection or because they are risk seekers. Second, criminals may 
discount the severity of punishment, particularly if it occurs long after 
the misconduct.42 A perpetrator fears criminal sanctions imposed 
tomorrow more than she does sanctions imposed in three or five years. 
As such, delays in the imposition of punishment are likely to cause a 
perpetrator to discount the impact of sanctions.43 This time-related 
discounting of sanctions is also likely to diminish the deterrent effect of 
additional penalties.44    
Both the subjective evaluation of risk, which affects certainty, 
and sanctions discounting, which affects severity, limit the efficacy of 
deterrence. But, whereas the latter can be addressed through 
alterations to the legal framework, the former is idiosyncratic. 
Individuals’ risk assessments are important to consider in aiming to 
achieve deterrence, but liability regimes cannot be tailored to such 
persons because, simply put, they may be beyond deterrence.  
Sanctions discounting, on the other hand, is attributable to the 
time lapse between misconduct and prosecution, and it is possible to 
address this issue through changes to the legal framework. Delays in 
the identification and prosecution of wrongdoers are common with 
regards to market manipulation. These crimes are often complex, and 
the legal framework makes it difficult for regulators and private 
plaintiffs to prove liability, thereby likely resulting in sanctions 
 
will always make a stronger impression.” (quoting Cesare Beccaria, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 
58 (David Young trans., Hackett Publ’g. Co. 1986) (1764))).   
 40. See Kimberly N. Varma & Anthony N. Doob, Deterring Economic Crimes: The Case of Tax 
Evasion, 40 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 165, 167 (1998) (“Deterrence theory assumes that there 
are intelligent, informed individuals who calculate the costs and benefits (perceived or actual) of 
undertaking one choice or another.”). 
 41. See Thomas A. Loughran, Raymond Paternoster, Alex R. Piquero & Greg Pogarsky, On 
Ambiguity in Perceptions of Risk: Implications for Criminal Decision Making and Deterrence, 49 
CRIMINOLOGY 1029, 1029–30 (2011) (discussing how an individual’s perceived certainty of 
punishment impacts the relative deterrent effect of that punishment).   
 42. Paternoster, supra note 27, at 820 (“[Scholars have] argued that in order to be effective 
in offsetting the perceived benefits of crime, punishment must come soon after the offense.”).  
 43. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION: RECONSIDERING THE 
PROSPECT OF SANCTION 11 (2009) (explaining how individuals measure the risk associated with 
committing a crime and how the estimation decreases the longer they are not sanctioned for 
committing a certain crime).   
 44. See id. (establishing that individuals’ underestimation of punishment undermines the 
deterrent objective of punishment). 
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discounting and diminished deterrence. For example, the Flash Crash 
occurred in 2010, but it was not until 2015 that the CFTC and the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) identified Navinder Singh Sarao  
as the perpetrator, and it took another three years to successfully 
prosecute Sarao.45  
Given sanctions discounting, many deterrence scholars focus on 
making changes to liability frameworks in ways that increase the 
certainty of punishment rather than the severity of sanctions.46 
Enhancing certainty can reduce the time delays that result in sanctions 
discounting, thereby making sanctions more effective.47 And 
emphasizing certainty is likely to have a greater deterrent effect on 
risk-seeking or overconfident criminals than would harsher sanctions.48  
Further, beyond sanctions discounting and risk evaluation, in 
comparing the relative effectiveness of severity versus certainty on 
achieving deterrence, certainty has been found to have a stronger 
deterrent effect.49 This is true not only because there is a greater 
objective likelihood of getting caught, but also because of its impact on 
 
 45. See Matt Levine, Guy Trading at Home Caused the Flash Crash, BLOOMBERG OP. (Apr. 
21, 2015, 5:37 PM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-04-21/guy-trading-at-
home-caused-the-flash-crash [https://perma.cc/UL2Q-EHCU] (explaining how Navinder Sarao’s 
spoofing strategy caused the Flash Crash); Margot Patrick, ‘Flash Crash’ Trader Navinder Sarao 
Worked with Fund Network Now Under Investigation, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 17, 2015, 3:54 AM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/flash-crash-trader-navinder-sarao-worked-with-fund-network-now-
under-investigation-1434527646 [https://perma.cc/SQ8K-RY8H] (explaining the strategy Sarao 
used that led to the Flash Crash); CFTC v. Sarao Futures Ltd., No. 15-cv-3398, 2016 WL 8257513 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2016) (discussing Sarao’s manipulating scheme and holding Sarao liable for 
engaging in spoofing).  
 46. See, e.g., Samuel Cameron, The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and 
Evidence, 41 KYKLOS 301, 306 (1988) (explaining that the degree of certainty of punishment is 
essential to deter crime and arguing that severity of punishment is ineffective if the individual 
believes he will not be punished); see also KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 16 (“The higher the  
chance of getting caught, and the higher the associated costs, the less likely that crime will  
be committed.”). 
 47. See Mark A. Cohen, The Economics of Crime and Punishment: Implications for 
Sentencing of Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 503, 514–15 
(2000) (providing empirical evidence that criminals are more deterred by certain punishment than 
severe sanctions). 
 48. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of 
Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1999) (“For risk-preferring 
individuals, the severity of imprisonment sanctions has a lesser effect on deterrence than the 
probability of sanctions . . . .”). 
 49. See Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 29, at 865 (“[P]unishment certainty is far more 
consistently found to deter crime than is punishment severity, and the extralegal consequences of 
crime seem at least as great a deterrent as do the legal consequences.”); VALERIE WRIGHT, SENT’G 
PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF 
PUNISHMENT 4 (2010), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ 
Deterrence-in-Criminal-Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLG3-KF5M] (“Criminological research over 
several decades and in various nations generally concludes that enhancing the certainty of 
punishment produces a stronger deterrent effect than increasing the severity of punishment.”). 
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public perception with respect to certainty of punishment.50 As an 
individual either (1) breaks the law and successfully avoids detection or 
punishment, or (2) witnesses others being successful in their criminal 
activities, she may perceive a decrease in the probability that she will 
be caught and punished for her misdeeds.51 But if she witnesses others 
being caught, a would-be perpetrator may evaluate that there is a 
strong likelihood that she will be detected and, therefore, refrain from 
engaging in misconduct.  
While not all forms of crime can be meaningfully analyzed under 
deterrence theory, monetary crimes, such as market manipulation, are 
amenable to the theory.52 Manipulation involves planning, reasoning, 
and having an awareness of how the markets work. Indeed, in 
discussing manipulation, regulators often frame their efforts in terms 
that presume a defendant calculates the profitability of her schemes, 
crafting regulatory responses aimed at altering that calculus.53   
1. Deterrence & Uncertainty 
To fully appreciate the role certainty plays in deterrence, it is 
necessary to unpack how uncertainty may arise in a legal framework. 
There are two primary forms of uncertainty that may diminish the 
deterrent effect of a liability framework. First, there may be legal 
uncertainty as to whether the perpetrator’s conduct is illegal.54 
Imprecise and unwieldly laws that claim to proscribe everything 
ultimately deter very little or, in some cases, nothing at all.55 Further, 
to the extent similar conduct may result in dissimilar penalties, legal 
uncertainty hampers deterrence. Deterrence theory presumes that a 
 
 50. See Paternoster, supra note 27, at 785 (explaining how “perceptual properties of 
punishment” affect deterrence). 
 51. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 11 (describing this as the “experiential effect,” where, “as 
time passes, many people come to lower their estimates of the risks of offending ,” and “as  
offenders commit crimes and escape sanction, or see others do so, they adjust their risk  
estimates downward”). 
 52. Baer, supra note 31, at 1309. 
 53. See Anti-manipulation and Anti-fraud Final Rules Fact Sheet, COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/document
s/file/amaf_factsheet_final.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/W64F-QKH4]. When 
filing complaints against market manipulation, the SEC will request both civil fines and 
disgorgement of any gains from market manipulation, including prejudgement interest. See, e.g., 
Final Judgement as to Defendant Howard M. Appel at 4, SEC v. Appel, No. 18-cv-3200-PD (E.D. 
Pa. May 10, 2019), ECF No. 11 (“Defendant is liable for disgorgement . . . together with 
prejudgment interest . . . .”). 
 54. See Baer, supra note 31, at 1313 (“[C]ritics of deterrence theory contend that most 
individuals are unaware of, or lack the ability to understand, complex legal rules.”). 
 55. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, On the Prospects of Deterring Corporate Crime, 2 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 25, 28–30 (2007) (“In prohibiting everything, vague and broad criminal laws  
prohibit nothing.”). 
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criminal knows her conduct is illegal;56 if she does not know that her 
conduct violates the law, she lacks the knowledge necessary to assess 
the costs and benefits stemming from her conduct.  
The problematic effect of this form of uncertainty on deterrence 
is one of overdeterrence of honest actors but underdeterrence of 
criminals. For honest, risk-averse individuals who fear being punished, 
legal uncertainty presents too great a risk to warrant continued 
participation in the markets and, as such, they prefer to exit to 
minimize the probability of punishment.57 On the other hand, under an 
uncertain legal regime, bad actors may proliferate as they rely on the 
existing ambiguities to defend their conduct and evade punishment.  
Many have written about the confusion and ambiguities that 
plague securities and commodities anti-manipulation laws.58 Neither 
the Exchange Act nor the CEA defines manipulation,59 and in some 
instances, the laws diverge in how to treat manipulative conduct.60 As 
 
 56. Baer, supra note 31, at 1310 (“Deterrence theory presumes that criminals know they are 
violating the law.”). 
 57. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 34, at 995 (“Even when the probability of punishment 
is less than one, if that probability declines as defendants take more care, then defendants may 
tend to overcomply.”); Rose, supra note 33, at 2190: 
The bottom line is that lawmakers face a clear tradeoff in setting sanctions: set 
sanctions high in an effort to deter more fraud, but risk increasing overdeterrence costs, 
or set them low to minimize overdeterrence costs, but risk increasing the incidence of 
fraud. If we assume, as seems reasonable, that those inclined to commit fraud are more 
likely to be risk seeking, whereas those inclined to obey the law are more likely to be 
risk averse, the tradeoff in sanction setting becomes even starker. 
 58. See e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality 
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 
653 (2002) (taking issue with the “strong inference” pleading standard to prove scienter under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act as there is no “precise definition” of the standard and it 
had at “least three different articulations”); Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: 
A (Very) Critical Analysis and a Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 1013 (1994) 
(describing the state of commodity market manipulation law as “extraordinarily misguided” due 
to its confusing and contradictory nature and thus creating “[a] law [that] is less a deterrent to 
manipulators than [it is] an invitation to them”).  
 59. Fischel & Ross, supra note 23, at 506 (highlighting that despite having “the prevention of 
manipulation as [their] primary goal . . . neither the Securities Exchange Act nor the Commodity 
Exchange Act attempts to define [manipulation]”); Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of 
Commodity Futures Prices—The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REGUL. 281, 313 (1991) 
(stating that the “Commodity Exchange Act did not define manipulation,” and so “the task of 
interpretation was left to the courts and to another small agency within the Department of 
Agriculture”); Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 
FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 346–48 (1987) (criticizing federal laws for prohibiting manipulation for over 
sixty-five years while simultaneously failing to provide a proper definition, before exploring a 
different perspective to determining manipulation based on “conduct that would be uneconomical 
or irrational, absent an effect on market price”). 
 60. See Fletcher, supra note 8, at 484–86 (underscoring the difference between the 
Commissions’ treatment of open-market manipulation as requiring only manipulative intent  
and the courts’ treatment of open-market manipulation as requiring both intent and  
“something more”). 
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the schemes underlying market manipulation evolve, especially with 
the increased utilization of algorithms and AI straddling the line 
between legal and illegal conduct, the ambiguities in the anti-
manipulation framework challenge its effectiveness at deterring 
manipulation. This is especially true for new, less understood forms of 
market manipulation, such as algorithm-related distortion or 
manipulation. Thus, in assessing the deterrent effect of the anti-
manipulation liability regime, one must consider whether and to what 
extent the framework creates uncertainty as to the legality of the 
conduct in question.  
Second, there may be legal uncertainty with respect to the 
capacity of the state to successfully prosecute a criminal. This 
uncertainty differs from legal ambiguity in that its focus is on the 
government’s capabilities to prosecute, which would include its 
resources, the burdens of proof it faces, and any evidentiary hurdles the 
legal regime requires prior to imposing liability. In considering the 
certainty of punishment, deterrence theory places emphasis on 
identification of wrongdoing and government willingness to prosecute 
perpetrators.61 Per this line of reasoning, if the government can identify 
and is willing to prosecute wrongdoing, then there is certainty of 
punishment. Even if the two criteria are met, however, there may be 
uncertainty of punishment if the state is unable to prosecute.62 For 
example, the state may be ill-equipped to bring charges due to limited 
resources. Similarly, if the legal regime renders the misconduct 
effectively beyond prosecution because of near-impossible standards of 
proof and evidentiary burdens, then the deterrent effect of the liability 
framework will be muted.63 
There is intense legal debate as to whether the anti-
manipulation legal regime needlessly hampers the ability of regulators 
to prosecute market manipulation. Indeed, one scholar has described 
manipulation in the commodities market as an “unprosecutable” crime 
because of the significant burdens imposed on the state to hold traders 
liable.64 For example, as traders outmaneuver and outspend regulators 
 
 61. See Baer, supra note 31, at 1344–45 (discussing how the government’s increased efforts 
to prosecute crime has a deterrent effect on wrongdoers). 
 62. See id. at 1343 (explaining that an increase in allocation of resources is necessary for an 
increased probability of detection). 
 63. See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 111–17 (4th ed. 2017) 
(explaining how courts have not established clear standards for certain elements for crimes under 
the Securities Laws, thus resulting in highly contested cases). 
 64. See Markham, supra note 59, at 357 (“[W]here a gross manipulation occurs, the 
government is still faced with the imposing burden of proving that the price was artificial and that 
the trader was attempting to create an artificial price rather than exploiting a market situation 
based upon natural forces.”). 
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on trading technology, a public sense of uncertainty may develop as to 
whether the state can effectively restrict manipulative and disruptive 
practices that exploit technological innovations. In turn, this 
contributes to an overall perception that both the regulators are weak 
and that manipulation is rampant is the markets.65 Thus, the limited 
resources of regulators become a source of uncertainty that impedes 
deterrence of market manipulation. In sum, the efficacy of the liability 
regime in deterring misconduct depends on the tools and resources that 
the state has at its disposal to prosecute. A legal enforcer weakened by 
burdensome standards of proof and limited resources does not serve as 
an effective deterrent to misconduct. 
2. The Limits of Emphasizing Severity  
Deterrence theory seeks to increase the cost of misconduct to 
potential perpetrators by increasing the certainty of punishment and 
the severity of sanctions. In keeping with the broader trend in the U.S. 
criminal justice system of preferring severity over certainty in deterring 
criminal conduct,66 lawmakers and the Commissions have focused their 
efforts to deter market manipulation on increasingly harsher 
penalties.67 Specifically, the Commissions have consistently increased 
the size of monetary penalties levied against wrongdoers each year. For 
example, in 2018, the SEC levied penalties totaling $1.439 billion, 
almost doubling its 2017 penalties of $832 million.68 Similarly, the size 
of the CFTC’s penalties has increased significantly in the past few 
years. During 2016 and 2017, the CFTC had three judgments each year 
 
 65. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 8, at 493 (discussing the Enron and WorldCom corporate 
frauds and their effect on market perception); Ana Carvajal & Jennifer Elliot, The Challenge of 
Enforcement in Securities Markets: Mission Impossible? (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper  
No. 09/168, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1457591 [https://perma.cc/ 
UH22-FHPY] (analyzing the effectiveness of market enforcement and its subsequent effects on 
investors’ confidence in the market).  
 66. See, e.g., Kelli D. Tomlinson, An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?, 
FED. PROB., Dec. 2016, at 33, 34 (“The United States has experienced an incarceration binge over 
the last several decades; in 1980 there were approximately 501,886 incarcerated persons in prisons 
and jails, and at year-end 2009 there were 2,284,913.”). 
 67. David M. Becker, What More Can Be Done to Deter Violations of the Federal Securities 
Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1852 (2012). 
 68. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R92-T76J]. To be 
clear, this number represents penalties for all violations of the securities laws, not only market 
manipulation cases.  
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that totaled $10 million or more; in contrast, in 2018, the agency had 
three times as many monetary judgments of that size.69  
The focus on severity is also evident in the enactment of 
legislation granting the Commissions access to more severe sanctions 
for market manipulation. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, granted 
the SEC the authority to impose civil money penalties in administrative 
proceedings.70 Prior to this amendment, the SEC was required to seek 
civil money penalties from a federal district court and, thus, was limited 
in the sanctions it could seek in administrative proceedings.71 Further, 
the Dodd-Frank Act increased the penalty amounts that the SEC could 
impose in these proceedings by fifty percent.72 With respect to the 
CFTC, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the agency to impose civil 
penalties equal to the greater of one million dollars or treble damages 
for violations of its anti-manipulation provisions.73 In adjudicating 
market manipulation cases, the courts likewise focus on severity of 
sanctions to deter future misconduct. In their sentencing, courts favor 
stricter, harsher punishments for market manipulators, altering the 
costs of the crime relative to its benefits, and thereby promoting 
deterrence.74 As one court stated, market manipulation “when detected, 
must be heavily punished if deterrence is to be achieved.”75 
 
 69. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DIVISION  
OF ENFORCEMENT 9 (2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11/ENFAnnualReport 
111418_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ9Q-BWDM]. Again, this number represents all penalties for 
violations of commodities laws, not only market manipulation cases.  
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a)(1). 
 71. Gideon Mark, SEC and CFTC Administrative Proceedings, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 45,  
46 (2016):  
Prior to Dodd-Frank, the SEC’s authority to impose civil penalties in an administrative 
proceeding (“AP”) was limited to registered entities and persons associated with 
registered entities . . . . For all other defendants the SEC was required to file a civil 
enforcement action in federal court. One consequence of this limitation was that the 
SEC historically commenced only 60% of its new cases as APs. 
 72. Compare Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-429, § 101(d)(2)(a), 104 Stat. 931, 932 (1990) (amending section 20 of the Securities Act of 
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t, to include a $5,000 maximum penalty for individuals), with Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(g)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 
1376, 1862 (2010) (increasing the penalty against individuals to $7,500). 
 73. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 753(a) (amending 
the Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 15, to expand the CFTC’s authority  
to pursue anti-manipulation violations); id. (outlining the range of penalties for anti- 
manipulation violations). 
 74. See, e.g., United States v. Castaldi, 743 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The judge 
addressed deterrence, both specific and general, and said that a Guideline sentence would not be 
adequate as a deterrent to this crime. . . . As noted, the sentence was the longest possible under 
the plea agreement: maximum consecutive sentences for a total of 276 months (twenty-three years) 
in prison”).  
 75. Reddy v. CFTC, 191 F.3d 109, 127 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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This focus on severity, however, is misplaced and ineffective 
against misconduct such as market manipulation. Empirical research 
supports this, finding that there is little to no deterrent effect resulting 
from harsher penalties.76 Indeed, according to research, harsher 
penalties may erode the deterrent effect of a liability regime by making 
sanctions less stigmatizing;77 reducing conviction rates;78 and, even, 
increasing crime.79 In the financial markets, the emphasis on severity 
has likely done little to deter manipulation.  
Public perception of the Commissions is that they are weak and 
ineffective, especially in safeguarding the markets against 
manipulation.80 Indeed, despite the steady increase in monetary 
sanctions for market manipulation, some have accused the 
Commissions of being too lenient against defendants. For example, the 
SEC often allows defendants to pay a fine while neither admitting nor 
denying wrongdoing.81 Similarly, in one of its first spoofing cases, the 
CFTC banned Michael Coscia from trading for only one year, which 
some saw as too lenient given the severity of the crime.82 Thus, even 
with increased sanctions against defendants, the Commissions are not 
 
 76. See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: 
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143 (2003) (explaining that more severe 
sentences are not more effective than less severe sentences in reducing crime).  
 77. Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 
23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 22 (1998) (“For an event to be stigmatizing it must be relatively uncommon.”).  
 78. Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1185 (2004) (“High penalties, instead of increasing conviction rates, may 
decrease them. As penalties increase, people may not be as willing to enforce them because of the 
disproportionate impact on those caught.”). 
 79. Tomislav V. Kovandzic, John J. Sloan, III & Lynne M. Vieraitis, “Striking out” as Crime 
Reduction Policy: The Impact of “Three Strikes” Laws on Crime Rates in U.S. Cities, 21 JUST. Q. 
207, 207, 234 (2004).  
 80. See, e.g., Dennis Kelleher, How the SEC Let Wall Street Run Wild, POLITICO (Dec. 12, 
2015, 7:23 AM EST), https://www.politico.com/agenda/how-the-sec-let-wall-street-run-wild-
000004 [https://perma.cc/N83S-TT75] (“Today, the SEC is failing to enforce the law and write 
regulations to deal with the profound flaws in our markets that create dangerous instability and 
harm everyday investors. . . . Enforcement of delinquent-filing actions does not deter market 
manipulation, major fraud and other serious misconduct at our largest financial institutions.”); see 
also MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 200–01 (2014) (attributing the drop in 
stock ownership to the notion that the market is unfair). 
 81. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Responding to Critics, S.E.C. Defends ‘No Wrongdoing’ 
Settlements, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 23, 2012, 5:17 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2012/02/22/s-e-c-chairwoman-defends-settlement-practices/ [https://perma.cc/9AC6-FWBN] (“The 
[SEC] frequently settles cases . . . by allowing a Wall Street firm to pay a fine . . . . The settlements 
usually do not require the defendants to admit any wrongful conduct. . . . Some people have 
questioned [the] deterrent effect and the value of relying on the “neither admit nor deny” clause.”).  
 82. Press Release, Bart Chilton, Comm’r, CFTC, Concurring Statement of Comm’r  
Bart Chilton in the Matter of Panther Energy Trading LLC and Michael J. 
Coscia (July 22, 2013), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement072
213 [https://perma.cc/7AHL-YG2F]. 
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viewed as effective regulators, thereby minimizing the deterrence of the 
regulatory regime.  
While these critiques of the Commissions appear to be debates 
over the severity or leniency of sanctions, the undercurrent in the 
conversation is one of certainty. Although the Commissions are 
increasing their sanctions, these higher sanctions are less impactful 
given the lack of certainty of punishment for manipulation. Ensuring 
certainty of punishment, therefore, ought to be the Commissions’ 
principal focus to enhance deterrence of manipulation in the markets.   
B. The Benefits of Deterrence for Financial Markets  
Manipulation undermines the fundamental purpose of the 
financial markets—efficient capital allocation.83 Manipulation weakens 
market efficiency by injecting inaccurate information into the markets 
and undermines investor protection, causing investors to exit the 
markets. Deterrence is key to limiting the pernicious effects of 
manipulation on the financial markets. An effective deterrence 
framework minimizes the consequences of manipulation, resulting in 
two overarching benefits for the market: enhanced market efficiency 
and greater investor protection. Deterrence, therefore, is at the core of 
financial regulators’ goals in overseeing and regulating the markets.  
1. Enhanced Market Efficiency 
Markets are efficient when they quickly incorporate available 
information into prices.84 The two primary market characteristics that 
contribute to market efficiency are price accuracy and liquidity.85 Price 
accuracy refers to the reliability of a price as a reflection of the 
fundamental value of an asset.86 Liquidity refers to the ready 
availability of other traders with whom to trade.87 The more liquid a 
market is, the easier it is for a trader to execute transactions without 
 
 83. See Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 
68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1631 (2015) (“Efficiency in processing information can, in theory at least, 
also help foster better allocation of capital in securities markets, so-called allocative efficiency.”). 
 84. Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New 
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 (2003) (“[A] market is ‘efficient’ when prices always fully reflect 
available information.”).  
 85. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 490. 
 86. Id. at 490–91. 
 87. Douglas J. Elliott, Market Liquidity: A Primer, BROOKINGS INST. 3 (2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Market-Liquidity.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
QVA9-J6QT] (explaining that liquidity emerges from ease of transactions based on time restraints, 
minimal transaction costs, and potential buyers willing to pay theoretical market value). 
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significant market movement.88 Greater market liquidity increases 
price accuracy and market efficiency as it allows traders to more easily 
reveal information through their transactions. Decreased liquidity 
reduces market efficiency because traders that cannot readily transact 
are likely to discount the value of an asset to account for this reality. 
Manipulation undercuts these two pillars of market efficiency by 
distorting informational efficiency of the markets. As to price accuracy, 
manipulation corrupts the information reflected in the price of an asset, 
thereby making the price less accurate. Manipulation schemes inject 
inaccurate information into the markets, which causes asset prices to 
deviate from their fundamental value.89 Thus, a trader’s ability to alter 
pricing data on which the market relies negatively impacts market 
efficiency and contributes to capital misallocation within the markets.  
Relatedly, in the face of manipulation, market liquidity also 
diminishes. As traders realize that asset prices are inaccurate, they 
may withdraw from the market to protect themselves from being on the 
losing end of a manipulative trade.90 The resulting illiquidity is akin to 
a tax on the markets that discourages honest traders from 
participating, further divorcing the market price of the asset from its 
fundamental value. Effective deterrence of manipulation, therefore, 
improves market efficiency by reducing the impact of market 
misconduct on the accuracy of asset pricing and the liquidity of  
the markets. 
2. Greater Investor Protection 
A familiar mechanism associated with investor protection is the 
mandatory disclosure system, which undergirds much of the financial 
regulatory system.91 Along with required disclosures, investor 
 
 88. See id. (discussing how liquid markets allow for assets to be sold quickly before a 
significant price movement can occur). 
 89. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 
DUKE L.J. 711, 730 (2006) (“The larger the deviation between price and value and the longer it 
takes for prices to revert to value, the less efficient the market is.”); Steve Thel, Regulation of 
Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices and the Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 398 (“Prices may change in response to false or misleading 
communications since security prices reflect what investors believe, even if those beliefs  
are wrong.”). 
 90. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Engineered Credit Default Swaps: Innovative or Manipulative?, 
94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1073, 1113 (2019) (“Engineered CDS transactions decrease the liquidity of the 
CDS market because traders are likely to withdraw from the markets owing to the decreased 
utility of CDS as risk mitigation tools.”). 
 91. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (requiring a publicly traded company to give annual disclosures of 
the firm’s “financial condition, changes in financial condition, [and] results of operations”). The 
SEC has created other rules that require disclosures on a quarterly basis and after any material 
changes in the firm’s financial condition or operations. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2019) (requiring 
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protection also extends to safeguarding market participants from 
abuses, such as fraud, misstatements, and manipulation.92 Ensuring 
that dishonest or unscrupulous traders do not exploit other market 
participants for profit is paramount to the market’s viability. To the 
extent investors doubt the integrity of the market or doubt that 
regulators cannot protect them from abuses, they are unlikely to invest 
their capital in the markets.93 Or, should they choose to invest, they will 
discount the price of assets being sold to account for the possibility of 
market abuses.94 Thus, investor protection through the deterrence of 
market distortion is a central goal of the anti-manipulation framework.  
II. MODERN MARKETS, MODERN MANIPULATION 
The financial markets have evolved significantly in recent years 
with the rise of technology and innovation. The result is not only a 
change in how the financial markets operate, but also the development 
of trading techniques and strategies that exploit technological advances 
to the detriment of the markets. Yet, despite these technological 
advances, the law of market manipulation is largely unchanged since it 
was enacted in the 1930s. The twofold consequences of the law’s failure 
to evolve are that the regulatory framework is ill-equipped to address 
novel developments in the financial markets and the law fails to 
effectively deter misconduct.   
This Part examines the contours of the existing legal and 
regulatory framework of market manipulation, highlighting the 
standards of proof necessary to hold someone liable for manipulation. 
Next, it examines the different ways in which technology is used in 
trading, specifically discussing algorithmic trading, high-frequency 
trading, and artificial intelligence in the financial markets. Lastly, this 
 
quarterly transition reports, called Form 10-Qs); 17 CFR § 249.308 (2019) (requiring reports of any 
material changes, called Form 8-Ks). Additionally, when first going public, a company is required 
to give detailed disclosures in its registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)–(b) (outlining 
registration requirements); 17 CFR § 239.11 (2020) (providing Form S-1 as the form for 
registration statements).  
 92. 1 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 4 (7th ed. 2018). 
 93. This is a classic “lemons market,” as first described by George Akerlof. According to 
Akerlof, in a market in which buyers do not know which cars are worth their asking price and 
which are not (that is, the lemons), the buyer will simply treat all cars like lemons. The result will 
be that worthy car sellers will leave the markets, unable to get an accurate price for their products, 
and lemon sellers will remain in the market. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: 
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 48 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970). 
 94. See Dionigi Gerace, Charles Chew, Christopher Whittaker & Paul Mazzola, Stock Market 
Manipulation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 8 AUSTRALASIAN ACCT. BUS. & FIN. J. 105, 136 
(2014) (“Manipulation is . . . associated with . . . reduced volume as investors exit the market 
rationally in fear of trading with a manipulator.”). 
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Part examines possible examples of algorithmic manipulation  
as a precursor to later analysis of the limitations of the anti- 
manipulation framework.  
A. The Existing Anti-Manipulation Framework 
Jurisdiction over market manipulation is principally divided 
between the SEC and the Exchange Act on the one hand, and the CFTC 
and the CEA on the other. Owing to markets being traditionally human-
dominated, anti-manipulation provisions in the Exchange Act and the 
CEA primarily center liability on the mental state of the actor. This 
Part examines four anti-manipulation provisions most applicable to 
algorithmic trading, highlighting the mental state required for each.   
1. Price Manipulation  
Price manipulation is proscribed under both Exchange Act 
section 9(a)(2) and CEA sections 6(c)(3) and 9(a)(2). Under the Acts, to 
prove price manipulation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the 
defendant had the ability to influence prices, (2) an artificial price 
existed, (3) the defendant caused the artificial price, and (4) the 
defendant specifically intended to cause the artificial price.95 Courts 
have indicated that, under the Exchange Act, evidence that the 
defendant specifically intended to manipulate the price is unnecessary; 
instead, a defendant may be liable if it can be proven that she willfully 
engaged in the misconduct underlying the violation.96 But to hold a 
defendant liable for price manipulation under the CEA, the CFTC must 
prove that the accused acted with the specific intent to create an 
 
 95. In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2013); CFTC v. 
Wilson, 27 F. Supp. 3d 517, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Fletcher, supra note 8, at 500–01 
(discussing the elements of the price manipulation standard).  
 96. “Manipulative purpose” is a required element to prove manipulative practice under 
section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78i. Under the penalty provisions of the Exchange 
Act, liability attaches when a person “willfully violates [the statute].” 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has interpreted this language not to 
necessitate proof of intent to specifically violate the Exchange Act, but rather the intent to willfully 
commit the act constituting the violation, and other courts have followed suit. United States v. 
Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d. Cir. 1972); see, e.g., United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670, 
711 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (applying the Second Circuit’s interpretation to not require proof of intent to 
violate the Exchange Act); United States v. Erikson, 601 F.2d 296, 304 n.12 (7th Cir. 1979) (“No 
proof of specific intent to violate the securities laws is necessary.” (citing Schwartz, 464 F.2d at 
509)). See infra Section II.A.2 for a discussion of the challenges of the recklessness standard.  
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artificial price that does not reflect legitimate forces of supply  
and demand.97  
The specific intent standard is a particularly high standard to 
meet and has resulted in the CFTC not litigating many price 
manipulation cases. Indeed, because of the exacting burden of proof 
imposed on the plaintiff to prove price manipulation, the CFTC, in its 
forty-year history, has managed to successfully prosecute only one price 
manipulation case.98 In an algorithmic world, it is questionable whether 
the price manipulation provision can meaningfully capture anything 
other than the most egregious misconduct in the markets given the high 
mental state requirement.  
2. Fraud-Based Manipulation  
The most widely used anti-manipulation provision is Exchange 
Act section 10(b) and its accompanying Rule 10b-5.99 Together, they 
provide the SEC with a broad basis to regulate most forms of abusive 
market behavior. A successful section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 action 
requires the plaintiff to show that (1) the defendant made a material 
misstatement or defrauded another party, (2) she committed these 
actions intentionally, (3) her actions were related to a securities sale or 
purchase, (4) the plaintiff or the markets in general relied on the 
misstatement or fraudulent conduct, and (5) the plaintiff was 
harmed.100 In 2010, the CFTC was granted similar anti-fraud authority 
under CEA section 6(c)(1), which mirrors Exchange Act section 10(b). 
Per CEA section 6(c)(1), the CFTC enacted Rule 180.1, which is 
identical to Rule 10b-5 in all material respects, signaling  
the incorporation of decades of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence  
and interpretation.101 
Under Rules 10b-5 and 180.1, to hold a defendant liable, the 
Commissions or private plaintiffs must show that the defendant acted 
 
 97. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,408 (July 14, 
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180). 
 98. Shaun D. Ledgerwood & Paul R. Carpenter, A Framework for the Analysis of Market 
Manipulation, 8 REV. L. & ECON. 253, 254 (2012) (noting that Bart Chilton, commissioner of the 
CFTC, admitted that “in 35 years, there has been only one successful prosecution [DiPlacido v. 
CFTC] for manipulation”). 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019). 
 100. See, e.g., ATSI Commc’n, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 101. The CFTC’s incorporation of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence has been explicit:  
Given the similarities between CEA section 6(c)(1) and Exchange Act section 10(b), the 
[CFTC] deems it appropriate and in the public interest to model final Rule 180.1 on 
SEC Rule 10b-5. To account for the differences between the securities markets and 
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either intentionally or recklessly.102 While the Supreme Court has never 
decided whether the scienter requirement encompasses recklessness, 
every federal appellate court has held that recklessness is sufficient, 
although the level of recklessness varies across the circuits.103 Courts 
have defined recklessness to be conduct that “departs so far from the 
standards of ordinary care that it is very difficult to believe the [actor] 
was not aware of what he was doing.”104 To meet the recklessness 
standard, the Commissions or private plaintiffs must demonstrate a 
strong inference of scienter, either by showing that the defendant had 
the motive and opportunity to manipulate or through strong 
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior.105 
Rule 10b-5 is the workhorse of the anti-manipulation 
framework, providing the basis for the majority of the anti-
manipulation cases brought by the Commissions and private plaintiffs. 
Despite its recency, the same is expected of Rule 180.1 given that it 
greatly expands the CFTC’s manipulation authority and is closely 
modeled on Rule 10b-5.106 Although the scienter requirement for Rules 
 
derivatives markets, the [CFTC] will be guided, but not controlled, by the substantial 
body of judicial precedent applying the comparable language of SEC Rule 10b-5. 
Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive 
Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399 (citation omitted). 
 102. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007): 
We have previously reserved the question whether reckless behavior is sufficient for 
civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Every Court of Appeals that has considered 
the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by showing that 
the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, though the Circuits differ on the degree 
of recklessness required. 
(citation omitted); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1980) (“[W]e hold that the Commission is 
required to establish scienter as an element of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of 
§ 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated under that section 
of the 1934 Act.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(quoting First Commodity Corp. v. CFTC, 676 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1982)); City of Dearborn Heights 
Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Waters Corp., 632 F.3d 751, 757 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting the 
definition of recklessness from Sundstrand Corp v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 
1977)); Gebhart v. SEC, 595 F.3d 1034, 1041–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that reckless conduct that 
constitutes scienter is an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care, and it presents a 
danger of misleading buyers or sellers that the defendant knew or must have known about); S. 
Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2009) (same); Flaherty & 
Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 2009) (same); 
Institutional Invs. Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 267 n.42 (3d Cir. 2009) (same). 
 104. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 850 F.2d at 748 (alteration in original) (quoting First 
Commodity Corp., 676 F.2d at 7). See also supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 105. Sharette v. Credit Suisse Int’l, 127 F. Supp. 3d. 60, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 106. Compare Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2020), 
with Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019) (17 C.F.R. 
§ 180.1 augments 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and clearly imitates 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5). See also Prohibition 
on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and 
Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,405 (explaining that the rule’s enforcement 
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10b-5 and 180.1 is lower than that of price manipulation, recklessness 
is not an easy standard to meet.107 With algorithmic trading, outside of 
clear cases in which a programmer deliberately or carelessly programs 
the algorithm to manipulate, it may be difficult to decipher from the 
algorithm’s code whether the programmer had manipulative intent 
(scienter) when she coded the algorithm. Thus, even with a lower 
scienter requirement, Rules 10b-5 and 180.1 may still pose challenges 
for regulators in proscribing some forms of algorithmic manipulation.  
3. Open-Market Manipulation  
Rules 10b-5 and 180.1 are also utilized in sanctioning open-
market manipulation. Open-market manipulation refers to 
manipulation accomplished through facially legitimate transactions.108 
Given that there is no per se fraud or misconduct in this form of market 
manipulation, courts have historically looked to the intent of the trader 
to determine whether the underlying conduct ought to be deemed 
manipulative. For example, short selling or heavy trading at the end of 
the trading day (marking the close) can be used to improperly distort 
prices but may also constitute a legitimate investment strategy 
depending on the goals of the investor. For most courts, liability for 
open-market manipulation turns on proof of the defendant’s intent to 
manipulate the markets even with legitimate transactions.109  
Part of the difficulty with open-market manipulation is that 
although liability arises from a violation of Rule 10b-5, courts have 
traditionally required proof that the defendant acted intentionally to 
manipulate the markets; recklessness is insufficient in these cases.110 
 
would “be guided, but not controlled by, judicial precedent interpreting and applying scienter 
under Exchange Act section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b–5”). 
 107. See Gregory Scopino, Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price of 
Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for Improper Trading Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 67 
FLA. L. REV. 221, 252 (2015) (“[T]he mental state requirements of many causes of actions could 
pose an insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs in private lawsuits and the CFTC in civil 
enforcement actions.”). 
 108. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 484. 
 109. See, e.g., Koch v. SEC, 793 F.3d 147, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977)) (finding that there is no requirement for “the SEC to prove actual 
market impact, as opposed to intent to affect the market, before finding liability for manipulative 
trading practices”). 
 110. See, e.g., Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 865 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating 
that liability for open-market manipulation required a showing of specific intent); see also David 
Yeres, Robert Houck & Brendan Stuart, A Bridge Too Far, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2019, 5:20 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1113505/a-bridge-too-far-cftc-s-reckless-manipulation-theory 
[https://perma.cc/72WH-WESK] (analyzing cases applying Rule 10b-5 to open-market 
manipulation to argue that more than recklessness is needed to hold a defendant liable). But it 
should be noted that in adopting Rule 180.1, the CFTC asserted that intentional or reckless 
conduct is sufficient to create liability for open-market manipulation. Response and Incorporated 
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This raises the evidentiary burden for the Commissions and private 
plaintiffs who must demonstrate that the defendant had manipulative 
intent when she engaged in her facially legitimate trades. For example, 
to be liable for open-market manipulation in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the plaintiff must prove that the intent 
to manipulate was the sole intent underlying the transactions.111 
Indeed, according to the court in SEC v. Masri, if the defendant had 
both legitimate and manipulative motives for her trades, she  
would not be liable for open-market manipulation if her trades were  
facially legitimate.112  
The high evidentiary requirement of open-market manipulation 
limits the availability of this theory of manipulation as a basis of 
liability for algorithmic manipulation in all but the most obvious cases. 
To the extent algorithms employ facially legitimate transactions that 
distort the markets, holding someone accountable in these instances 
may prove difficult. This is particularly true in light of the difficulty the 
Commissions have had in holding human traders liable for open-market 
manipulation in the past.113 
4. Spoofing  
The most recent addition to the anti-manipulation framework is 
the CFTC’s anti-spoofing authority. The Dodd-Frank Act amended the 
CEA to prohibit “any trading, practice, or conduct . . . [that] is, is of the 
character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, spoofing[,]” which 
it defines as “bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer 
before execution.”114 To aid the markets in understanding how the 
newly enacted spoofing provision would apply, the CFTC issued 
interpretative guidance to delineate the scope of the prohibition.115 In 
the guidance, the CFTC identified four nonexhaustive examples of 
behavior that it would classify as spoofing: (1) submitting or cancelling 
orders to overload the quotation system, (2) submitting or cancelling 
bids to impede another’s execution of trades, (3) submitting or 
 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 18–22, CFTC v. Kraft 
Foods Grp., Inc., No. 1:15-cv-02881 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2020), ECF No. 64; see also Prohibition on the 
Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition 
on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399 (stating that Rule 180.1 can be violated by a showing 
of reckless or intentional conduct).   
 111. SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 370–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 112. Id. at 372. 
 113. See CFTC v. Wilson, 27 F. Supp. 3d 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 114. Commodity Exchange Act § 4c(a)(5), 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 747, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 115. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890 (May 28, 2013). 
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cancelling orders to create a false appearance of market depth,  
and (4) submitting or cancelling bids with the intent to create an 
artificial price.116  
Liability for spoofing attaches if the trader acted intentionally to 
cancel the bid or offer—that is, the actor must have been more than 
reckless for her actions to constitute spoofing.117 Notably, by tying 
liability to the intent of the trader, the anti-spoofing prohibition 
adheres to the intent-focused model of prior anti-manipulation 
provisions, despite being directed towards a modern, algorithm-
dominated marketplace. In remaining tethered to an intent-centric 
framework, the newly enacted spoofing laws may also be less effective 
at deterring the very conduct they are aimed at proscribing.  
 
*        *        * 
 
As the above discussion demonstrates, the existing anti-
manipulation framework’s liability provisions are centered firmly 
around the intent of the actor. In human-dominated markets, this focus 
on intent was understandable. Modern financial markets, however, are 
not human-centric. Computers and algorithms dominate the markets, 
thereby challenging the efficacy of an intent-focused liability regime in 
deterring manipulation in the modern marketplace. The following 
Section discusses the involvement of algorithms in modern-day trading 
and its impact on how the market functions.  
B. Modern Trading  
Algorithmic trading dominates the securities and commodities 
markets, accounting for nearly sixty percent of all transactions in each 
market.118 The development of technology has impacted the financial 
markets significantly, allowing for faster transaction execution, 
lowered costs, and greater efficiency in the markets overall. In 
analyzing the consequences and implications of technology in the 
markets, legal scholars have focused on algorithmic trading and high-
 
 116. Id. at 31,896. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Chris Isidore, Machines Are Driving Wall Street’s Wild Ride, Not Humans, CNN: BUS. 
(Feb. 6, 2018, 4:02 PM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/06/investing/wall-street-computers-
program-trading/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZQP3-BCK6] (“On a typical trading day, computers 
account for 50% to 60% of market trades.”); Gregory Meyer, Nicole Bullock & Joe Rennison, How 
High Frequency Trading Hit a Speed Bump, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/d81f96ea-d43c-11e7-a303-9060cb1e5f44 [https://perma.cc/XUE3-6DPE] (graph depicting 
high frequency trading constituting between approximately thirty and fifty-five percent of U.S. 
equities volume from 2007 to 2017, respectively). 
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frequency trading (“HF trading”). Although these are important 
developments in the market, the next frontier in technology lies in the 
integration of AI and machine learning in trading algorithms. This 
Section examines early iterations of algorithmic trading, including HF 
trading, and then assesses how AI and machine learning continue to 
revolutionize trading.  
1. Algorithmic Trading and HF Trading 
Algorithmic trading refers to the use of preprogrammed 
electronic instructions in trading securities or commodities.119 Trading 
algorithms are programmed to execute specific trading strategies based 
on preset rules that inform the algorithm when and how to act. For 
example, a simple trading algorithm could be programmed to buy five 
thousand shares of Widget, Inc. if and when the shares are $150 per 
share. Once the shares reach the desired price, the algorithm initiates 
a purchase order for Widget shares, sending its order to an exchange or 
electronic communication network for the desired purchase volume. 
Yet, trading algorithms can also be much more complex—disseminating 
upper and lower limits for transactions or changing trading strategies 
based on newly released information.120  
Notwithstanding this complexity, programmers are still 
required to code these investment decisions into rules-based 
instructions that the algorithm can follow as it trades in the markets.121 
Programmers code trading algorithms to evaluate collected data, attach 
value to the data, and decide how to trade to accomplish the overarching 
trading strategy.122 Within the scope of their rules-based set of 
instructions, algorithmic trading programs make decisions, such as 
when to initiate buy and sell orders, the volume of the transaction, and 
 
 119. Johannes Prix, Otto Loistl & Michael Huetl, Algorithmic Trading Patterns in Xetra 
Orders, 13 EUR. J. FIN. 717, 717 (2007). 
 120. TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE 
IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 10 (July 2011), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf [https://perma.cc/758K-2YG3]: 
In its simplest guise, algorithmic trading may just involve the use of a basic 
algorithm . . . to feed portions of an order into the market at pre-set intervals to 
minimise market impact cost. At its most complex, it may entail many algorithms that 
are able to assimilate information from multiple markets . . . in fractions of a second. 
 121. RISHI K. NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO QUANTITATIVE AND HIGH-
FREQUENCY TRADING 8–9, 24–62 (2d ed. 2013). 
 122. Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1064 
(2016) (showing that programmers institute trading strategies in particularized ways by: “(1) 
collecting data for trading; (2) submitting orders/canceling orders; (3) establishing the price, 
amount, and type of trades to make; (4) anticipating the impact of trading on future price changes; 
(5) responding to unplanned events; and (6) determining when to stop trading”). 
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the transaction’s timing. Further, these programs do so in response to 
their analysis of the markets and expectations of market movements.123 
Algorithms can internalize, assess, and respond to large quantities of 
data faster than any human can, quickening the pace at which 
transactions occur in the markets, but with little to no human 
intervention after the algorithm has been deployed in the markets.  
The speed at which algorithms execute transactions is a 
hallmark feature of a subset of algorithmic trading programs, known as 
HF trading. HF trading broadly refers to the rapid, high-volume 
placement and cancellation of bids and offers to realize short-term 
arbitrage profits.124 While there is no agreed-upon definition, common 
features of HF trading include heavy reliance on algorithms and a focus 
on speed.125 HF traders leverage technology, algorithms, and speed to 
gain an advantage over other traders in the market. Indeed, the success 
and profitability of HF traders is directly influenced by speed, that is, 
the ability to execute transactions faster than others in the market.126 
The importance of speed to HF trading means that traders expend 
considerable capital and expertise to reduce the time it takes to trade 
and maximize available information for profitability.127 
 
 123. Alain Chaboud, Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson & Clara Vega, Rise of the 
Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market 1 (Bd. of Governors for the Fed. 
Rsrv. Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion Paper No. 980, Oct. 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
pubs/ifdp/2009/980/ifdp980.pdf [https://perma.cc/F69R-Z3XS] (“In algorithmic trading (AT), 
[traders’] computers directly interface with trading platforms, placing orders without immediate 
human intervention. The computers observe market data and possibly other information at  
very high frequency, and, based on a built-in algorithm, send back trading instructions, often  
within milliseconds.”). 
 124. There is no agreed-upon definition of HF trading. In a 2010 concept release, the SEC 
identified five general characteristics that can be used to identify HF trading:  
(1) The use of extraordinarily high-speed and sophisticated computer programs for 
generating, routing, and executing orders; (2) use of co-location services and individual 
data feeds offered by exchanges and others to minimize network and other types of 
latencies; (3) very short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions; (4) the 
submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission; and (5) 
ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying 
significant, unhedged positions overnight). 
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3606 (2010). 
 125. McGowan, supra note 2, ¶¶ 2–3 (finding that, at its core, HF trading uses an “algorithm 
[to] make[ ] important decisions such as timing, price, or in many cases, executing the entire order 
without human interaction” while “being smarter and faster than everyone else”). 
 126. Id. ¶ 16 (“The speed factor in trading is known as ‘latency’, and is an important component 
of all high-frequency trading strategies.”).  
 127. See id.: 
In order to turn a profit, HF traders have to flow information into their algorithms 
microseconds faster than their competitors. Therefore, to remain competitive, HF 
traders must constantly upgrade their computer systems to stay ahead of the pack. . . . 
In the HF trading world, speed and the most innovative technology separate the 
winners from the losers. The current trend in employee recruiting is to hire traders with 
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HF trading strategies rely on algorithms to submit and route 
trades to find and exploit arbitrage opportunities in the markets.128 The 
predefined rules that govern an HF trading algorithm allow traders to 
execute complex trades in response to newly disclosed information 
ahead of slower traders in the market.129 HF trading relies on 
algorithms to “analyze market data, organize trades based on pre-
programmed instructions, access . . . trading center servers, and trade 
execution benefits.”130 HF algorithm programming, therefore, must be 
precise and detailed to effectively accomplish its trading goals. Once 
deployed in the market, the profitability of HF trading algorithms 
depends on being able to operate and make decisions in furtherance of 
the underlying goal without human intervention. Thus, the rules on 
which an HF trading algorithm is based at the outset are of  
paramount importance, and deciphering the underlying motivations of 
the programmer from these rules is essential to any liability for  
market manipulation.  
2. Artificial Intelligence & Machine Learning  
Although HF trading algorithms currently dominate the 
discourse on computerized trading, the very near future of algorithmic 
trading lies with AI and machine-learning algorithms.131 The 
development of sophisticated learning algorithms is occurring at an 
accelerated speed throughout society. From speech recognition, to self-
driving cars, to smart home speakers like Alexa, artificially intelligent, 
machine-learning algorithms are becoming more prevalent in everyday 
life.132 And the financial markets are no different. 
Algorithmic trading is evolving to incorporate sophisticated AI 
and machine-learning tools and techniques that allow algorithms to 
 
degrees in math and computer science from the top schools, many traders even with 
PhD’s, in order to stay competitive. 
 128. Id. ¶ 3. 
 129. Id. ¶ 16. 
 130. Kristin N. Johnson, Regulating Innovations: High Frequency Trading in Dark Pools, 42 
J. CORP. L. 833, 857 (2017). 
 131. GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., THE FUTURE OF COMPUTER TRADING IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 36 (2012), http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight [https://perma.cc/5UND-
R894] (scroll down to and click on “Future of computer trading in financial markets: an 
international perspective”) (“Since the late 1990s, researchers have also studied the use of 
automated optimisation methods to design and improve [autonomous] adaptive trading 
algorithms. . . . The use of these techniques in the finance industry looks likely to grow over the 
next decade.”).  
 132. Bill Kleyman, Smart Things Everywhere: The Connected Future of 2025, DATA CTR. 
FRONTIER (Aug. 21, 2018), https://datacenterfrontier.com/smart-things-everywhere-the-connected-
future-of-2025 [https://perma.cc/RU93-GAQN]: 
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dynamically learn from data, assess inputs, and incorporate new 
information into their decisionmaking. As discussed above, traditional 
trading algorithms, whether HF or not, are preprogrammed to operate 
within set parameters to fulfill a predetermined trading trajectory or 
strategy. Unlike traditional algorithmic trading programs, AI machine-
learning algorithms have the capacity to learn from data and prior 
decisions, truly minimizing human involvement in trading.133  
With AI machine-learning algorithms, coders specify a goal or a 
set of goals for the algorithm to achieve when solving a problem.134 The 
algorithm is not given any rules for how to solve the problem at hand. 
Rather, it may be given rules on how to learn or it may be left to figure 
out how to solve the problem on its own through trial and error of 
similar problems. In learning from the available data, AI machine-
learning algorithms are able to fine-tune their own decisionmaking 
through repeated practice on the provided data.135 Thus, these 
algorithms are not merely executing preprogrammed instructions but, 
instead, are dynamically learning and solving problems based on the 
data available, eliminating the need for human involvement in  
their processes.  
Importantly, the solutions that AI machine-learning algorithms 
provide may be beyond any results the coder considered or expected 
when she programmed the algorithm. Because the algorithm learns by 
making inferences, connections, and classifications from the data, the 
output from the algorithm may not be evident even to the programmer 
because of how the AI machine-learning algorithm learns. One popular 
technique used in AI machine-learning algorithms is the 
implementation of a neural network. Neural networks, particularly 
deep learning models, utilize virtual neurons to identify patterns in the 
data or make logical inferences and connections between data points.136 
 
By 2025, “smart” will become the new normal. . . . [Much of our technological 
experience] will involve cognitive systems that interact with the data that we generate, 
creating new layers of data analysis across a range of industries, applications, and 
scenarios. [International Data Corporation] estimates that the volume of analyzed data 
that is “touched” by cognitive systems will grow by a factor of 100 to 1.4 zettabytes  
in 2025. 
 133. Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. 
REV. 54, 68–69 (2019): 
[T]oday, machine learning algorithms are trained on a body of data that is selected by 
designers or by past human practices. This process is the “learning” element in machine 
learning; the algorithm learns, for example, how to pair queries and results based on a 
body of data that produced satisfactory pairs in the past. 
 134. Id. at 62–63. 
 135. Id. at 68–69. 
 136. For an overview of neural networks, see Victor Zhou, Machine Learning for  
Beginners: An Introduction to Neural Networks, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Mar. 5, 2019), 
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Deep networks of neurons work together to arrive at a solution or 
decision based on an algorithm’s analysis and internalization of the 
data. Oftentimes, it is not easy to discern why a deep neural network 
produced a given output or solution because the algorithm’s 
decisionmaking process is “intuitive.”137  To illustrate, the outputs of 
preset algorithms can be retraced by walking backwards through the 
preprogrammed rules. But neural networks significantly complicate 
this retracing process as there are no clear steps or discernible reasons 
for each decision in its “thinking.”138 
The complexity underlying the operation of these AI machine- 
learning algorithms creates a “black box” problem, that is, “an inability 
to fully understand an AI’s decision-making process and the inability to 
predict the AI’s decisions or outputs.”139 Being unable to explain the 
outputs of the algorithm ex post limits the ability of humans to 
understand how they operate or supervise their use. Further, with a 
“strong black box,” ex post analysis and reverse engineering to 
understand how and why the AI machine-learning algorithm came to 
its decision is not possible.140 This renders the AI machine-learning 
algorithm’s functioning opaque to human oversight and supervision. As 
AI machine-learning algorithms are introduced into the financial 
markets, questions arise as to the capacity of the regulatory framework 
to prevent and deter market manipulation. Unlike the rules-based 
criteria of HF algorithms, AI machine-learning algorithms learn and 
make dynamic, intuitive decisions that challenge the scienter-focused 
anti-manipulation regime.  
C. Algorithmic Manipulation: Assessing the Possibilities 
With the dominance of algorithmic trading, the concerns with 
respect to manipulation have moved away from focusing on the 
misconduct of human traders and instead towards detecting and 
deterring algorithmic manipulation. As one academic has stated, 
algorithmic manipulation schemes “can be undertaken much more 




 137. Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and 
Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 902 (2018) (“Because a neural network is learning from 
experience, its decision-making process is likewise intuitive.”).  
 138. Id. at 902–03 (“No single neuron in these networks encodes a distinct part of the decision-
making process. The thousands or hundreds of thousands of neurons work together to arrive at a 
decision . . . [and] often what is encoded will not be intelligible to human beings.”). 
 139. Id. at 905.  
 140. Id. at 906.  
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market manipulation schemes.141 This precision, coupled with the 
automated and increasingly AI-nature of algorithmic trading, makes 
algorithmic manipulation a particularly pernicious problem, both in the 
market and for regulators. This Section analyzes potential examples of 
how algorithmic manipulation may manifest in the markets.  
1. The Easy Case: Deliberate Misuse of Algorithms 
Programmers can code algorithms to deliberately distort and 
disrupt the markets. For example, a trader can deliberately program an 
algorithm to “spoof” the market. Spoofing captured the attention of 
regulators and the public because of its role in the Flash Crash—the 
almost one-thousand point fall and rebound of the Dow Jones Index that 
destabilized the U.S. securities markets in May 2010.142 Since then, 
regulators have brought numerous enforcement actions against traders 
for spoofing in equities, precious metals, and other commodities.143  
Statutorily, spoofing is defined as placing an order with the 
intent to cancel prior to execution.144 Practically, spoofing is a distortive 
trading strategy with a few steps. First, a trader places a large, non-
bona fide order on one side of the market causing the market to move 
in response to the trade. Second, after the market has moved, the trader 
places a small bona fide order on the other side of the market. The 
smaller bona fide order is filled at the artificial price, earning the trader 
a profit. Third, the trader cancels the large order, ending the scheme.145 
To use a concrete example: Shares of Widget Co. are trading at 
$5.25/share. Sarah Spoofer enters a buy order for one thousand shares 
of Widget Co. at $5.45/share. In response to the large buy order, the 
price of Widget Co. increases to $5.40/share, at which point Sarah 
 
 141. Yadav, supra note 122, at 1069.  
 142. Owen Davis, Navinder Singh Sarao and the Flash Crash, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015, 
12:39 PM), https://www.ibtimes.com/navinder-singh-sarao-flash-crash-why-financial-market-
spoofing-so-hard-catch-even-1898716 [https://perma.cc/QPR3-267G ] (“On the day of the crash—
May 6, 2010—Sarao allegedly entered more than 32,000 orders to sell futures contracts, then 
canceled the vast majority of them. The technique, known as spoofing, allegedly allowed Sarao to 
profit from artificial price movements.”); see also Treanor, supra note 5 (“[D]espite the turbulent 
start to the trading day, no one had expected the near 1,000-point dive in share prices.”). 
 143. See, e.g., CFTC v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (the CFTC alleged 
that defendants were engaged in spoofing by placing large orders in the future contracts market, 
with the intent to cancel before execution); CFTC v. Khara, No. 15 CV 03497, 2015 WL 2066257 
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2015) (the CFTC alleged that defendants engaged in unlawful conduct in the gold 
and silver futures markets by “bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer  
before execution”).  
 144. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C). 
 145. See Lin, supra note 24, at 1289 (“Spoofing allows the initiating party to distort the 
ordinary price discovery in the marketplace by placing orders with no intention of ever executing 
them and merely for the purpose of manipulating honest participants in the marketplace.”). 
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enters a second order to sell one hundred shares of Widget at 
$5.40/share, earning her a profit of $0.15/share.  
The above-described scheme nets Sarah $15 if done manually, 
slowly, and only once. But if Sarah deploys HF trading algorithms to 
execute the same scheme—repeatedly, at a high volume, and across 
numerous asset classes—she increases the profitability of the trading 
strategy exponentially.146 HF trading algorithms can be coded to place, 
then cancel, large market-moving orders on one side of the market and 
also submit orders on the other side of the market to benefit from the 
subsequent price movement. In 2013, the CFTC and the DOJ brought 
their first criminal spoofing case against Michael Coscia and his firm 
Panther Energy Trading LLC (collectively, “Coscia”).147 Coscia deployed 
two algorithmic trading programs across approximately twelve 
different commodities markets to create an illusion of demand, thereby 
enabling him to earn profits on smaller trades on the opposite side of 
the market.148 According to prosecutors, with the aid of algorithmic 
trading programs, Coscia netted $1.4 million in illegal profits in less 
than three months.149  
Similarly, but with more devastating consequences, Navinder 
Sarao used algorithmic trading programs to flood the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange with orders to sell millions of dollars’ worth of 
securities as part of his spoofing strategy.150 Sarao’s algorithms, 
however, did more than just earn him illicit profits through depressing 
the price of the security: the algorithm’s large sell order sent the 
markets into a twenty-minute state of extreme volatility.151 In that brief 
 
 146. Id. at 1289.  
 147. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Panther Energy 
Trading LLC and Its Principal Michael J. Coscia to Pay $2.8 Million and Bans Them from  
Trading for One Year, for Spoofing in Numerous Commodity Futures Contracts (July 22,  
2013), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/6649-13 [https://perma.cc/6MPS-A8S7] 
[hereinafter CFTC Press Release on Coscia]; Michael M. Philipp & Dina R. Kaufman, Prosecutors 
Record First-Ever Conviction for ‘Spoofing’: A New Era of Trading Enforcement, MORGAN LEWIS: 
LAWFLASH (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2015/11/prosecutors-record-first-
ever-conviction-for-spoofing [https://perma.cc/9GWM-E48H]. 
 148. Philipp & Kaufman, supra note 147 (detailing Coscia’s spoofing method). 
 149. Id. (“The CFTC Order requires Panther and Coscia to . . . disgorge $1.4 million in trading 
profits . . . .”). 
 150. See Davis, supra note 142 (“The technique, known as spoofing, allegedly allowed Sarao to 
profit from artificial price movements.”). 
 151. Id. (“The criminal complaint says that Sarao’s offers to sell Standard & Poor’s 500 E-
Minis, a commonly traded stock index future, eventually totaled 29 percent of the market.”); 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE 
MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 2, 5 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/ 
marketevents-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEV5-3F68]: 
However, on May 6, when markets were already under stress, the Sell Algorithm chosen 
by the large trader to only target trading volume, and neither price nor time, executed 
the sell program extremely rapidly in just 20 minutes. . . . Between 2:40 p.m. and 3:00 
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window of time, prices of various financial products plummeted to 
pennies, while other prices increased to incredulous highs.152 Owing to 
the volatility, traders exited the market, thereby reducing liquidity and 
exacerbating the crisis.153 When the dust settled, the market had 
suffered approximately one trillion dollars in losses.154  
In both examples, the traders programmed their trading 
algorithms to deliberately distort the markets. The trading algorithms 
were instructed to flood the markets, which created artificial prices and 
allowed each defendant to profit.155 Although it took authorities months 
to piece together what occurred in the market each time, the trading 
algorithms left a paper trail that allowed regulators to decipher what 
happened and how.156 The design of these rules-based algorithms also 
demonstrated the true, underlying intent of the traders. Notably, both 
Coscia and Sarao defended their actions by claiming that the 
algorithms’ actions did not reflect their intentions as the programmer. 
Once regulators gained access to the trading algorithms, however, the 
traders’ manipulative intent was evident from the programming 
language.157 In similarly “easy” cases involving the deliberate misuse of 
algorithms for manipulation, regulators should be able to meet the 
 
p.m., approximately 2 billion shares traded with a total volume exceeding $56 billion. 
Over 98% of all shares were executed at prices within 10% of their 2:40 p.m. value. 
However, as liquidity completely evaporated in a number of individual securities and 
ETFs, participants instructed to sell (or buy) at the market found no immediately 
available buy interest (or sell interest) resulting in trades being executed at irrational 
prices as low as one penny . . . . 
 152. Johnson, supra note 130, at 835 (explaining the Flash Crash in 2010 and detailing some 
of the price fluctuations that occurred during the crash).  
 153. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 151, at 1, 
35–37 (discussing the exodus of traders due to volatility and ensuing reduction in liquidity); see 
also Matt Phillips, Nasdaq: Here’s Our Timeline of the Flash Crash, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2010, 
12:34 PM ET), https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/05/11/nasdaq-heres-our-timeline-of-the-
flash-crash [https://perma.cc/52YA-XGCG] (reporting on and analyzing the statements of 
executives from NASDAQ and NYSE outlining the timeline of the flash crashes during a related 
congressional hearing). 
 154. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 151; 
Phillips, supra note 153; see also Edgar Ortega Barrales, Lessons from the Flash Crash for the 
Regulation of High-Frequency Traders, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1195, 1196 (2012) (“In 
twenty minutes on May 6, 2010, stock market investors lost about $862 billion.”).  
 155. CFTC Press Release on Coscia, supra note 147; Davis, supra note 142. 
 156. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 151; Davis, 
supra note 142. 
 157. See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Futures Trader Charged with Illegally Manipulating 
Stock Market, Contributing to the May 2010 Market ‘Flash Crash’ (Apr. 21, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/futures-trader-charged-illegally-manipulating-stock-market-
contributing-may-2010-market-flash [https://perma.cc/PU4B-L8T2] (explaining that Sarao’s 
algorithm used a “ ‘dynamic layering’ scheme . . . [to] create[ ] the appearance of substantial supply 
in the market”); CFTC Press Release on Coscia, supra note 147 (“While forms of algorithmic 
trading are of course lawful, using a computer program that is written to spoof the market is illegal 
and will not be tolerated.”).  
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evidentiary burden of scienter through the paper trail left in the rules 
of the algorithm’s source code. To the extent there are obvious or 
plausible signs of manipulative intent, it ought to be straightforward 
enough to hold defendants liable for violating Rule 10b-5, Rule 180.1, 
or the spoofing provision.  
Yet, Coscia and Sarao’s claims that the algorithms’ actions did 
not reflect their intentions as the programmer are noteworthy. Their 
claims demonstrate that perpetrators of algorithmic manipulation are 
likely to point to the innate layer of abstraction between themselves and 
the algorithm as a defense. Simply put, traders accused of algorithmic 
manipulation will likely raise as a defense differences between what 
they intended the algorithm to do and what the algorithm actually did. 
Such defenses are not likely to hold in deliberate manipulation cases, 
especially those involving rules-based algorithms that can be reverse 
engineered. With access to a trading program’s design and rules, 
regulators should be able to ferret out the true intent of traders. It 
remains to be seen, however, whether regulators have the time and 
resources to effectively assign liability for such manipulative conduct.  
2. The Medium Case: Open-Market Manipulation &  
Unintended but Harmful Distortion 
A stronger challenge to the anti-manipulation framework arises 
when the intent of the programmer may not be evident from the 
programming code. While this may be possible in numerous instances, 
two are highlighted here.  
First, the manipulative intent of the programmer may not be 
evident if the algorithm is designed to use facially legitimate 
transactions to distort the markets (that is, to engage in open-market 
manipulation).158 A trader could program her trading algorithm to short 
sell stocks aggressively or to engage in heavy trading at the end of the 
day, a strategy known as marking the close.159 Either strategy can cause 
a significant impact on the price of the stock because of the timing and 
volume of the transactions. Neither practice, however, is per se illegal. 
As previously discussed, to determine whether such practices are 
manipulative, courts have traditionally looked to the intent of the 
 
 158. Fletcher, supra note 8 (defining open-market manipulation). 
 159. See id. at 506–07 (identifying the practice of short selling as a common manipulative 
trading strategy, especially when it is “aggressive,” and the practice of marking the close); In re 
Kocherhans, Exchange Act Release No. 36556, 60 SEC Docket 2210, 2212 (Dec. 6, 1995) (defining 
“marking the close” as a manipulative practice that is employed in an attempt to “influence the 
closing price of a stock by executing purchase or sale orders at or near the close of the market”). 
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trader.160 But with trading algorithms, even those that operate on 
preprogrammed instructions, making such determinations regarding 
manipulative intent can be quite difficult. In this instance, despite the 
paper trail the algorithm leaves behind, it may not be enough to 
decipher a clear intent to manipulate to meet the scienter requirement 
for open-market manipulation.  
Second, the algorithm may operate in a way that is unexpected 
and truly does not reflect the intent of the programmer. Here, the 
algorithm’s unexpected behavior does not arise from the algorithm’s 
“intuitive” neural response to data. Rather, the unexpected distortion 
is the result of a failure to properly design and test the algorithm before 
installation, a failure to properly monitor and respond to warning signs 
of potential, or a mistake in the algorithm’s code. If one defines 
manipulation based on the intent of the actor, as many scholars and 
jurists do,161 such conduct may not rise to the level of illegal 
manipulation. Instead, this conduct may be classified as negligent or 
reckless. Even if one does not deem the unintended consequences to be 
illegal manipulation, such algorithms can nonetheless wreak havoc and 
have dire consequences for the market. Under the current anti-
manipulation framework, it is highly doubtful that liability would 
attach for such unintended distortion, unless the Commissions are able 
to prove that the defendant’s conduct rose to the level of recklessness 
necessary to violate Rule 10b-5 or Rule 180.1.162 
3. The Hard Case: Rational Distortion & Independent Misconduct 
The most significant challenge to the anti-manipulation 
framework stems from AI machine-learning algorithms that may 
distort the markets as part of their dynamic learning and 
 
 160. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 161. Manipulative purpose is a required element to prove manipulative practice under section 
9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2). Courts and scholars repeatedly analyze 
manipulative purpose by utilizing circumstantial evidence to extrapolate intent. See, e.g., United 
States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 331–32 (2d Cir. 1964) (describing the criteria that should inform 
analysis of circumstantial evidence to discern intent); In re The Federal Corp., Exchange Act 
Release No. 3909, 25 S.E.C. 227, 230 (Jan. 19, 1947) (“Since it is impossible to probe into the depths 
of [an actor]’s mind [to prove manipulative purpose], it is [usually] necessary . . . that the finding 
of manipulative purpose be based on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.”); Fischel & 
Ross, supra note 23, at 510 (“The only definition [of manipulation] that makes any sense is 
subjective—it focuses entirely on the intent of the [actor].”); see also supra Section II.A (discussing 
the scienter element of the Acts). 
 162. This analysis is limited to liability under the anti-manipulation framework specifically 
and does not address potential liability under FINRA or NFA rules or other Commission 
regulations that may capture this form of misconduct. See, e.g., Yadav, supra note 122, at 1039, 
1057–58 (discussing how the negligence standard and the market access rule addressed similar 
unintended distortions in the securities markets).  
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decisionmaking process. To the extent algorithmic trading programs 
are capable of learning and making independent (that is, not merely 
rules-based) decisions to meet set goals, then there is possibility that 
an algorithm may manipulate the market in unforeseen and even 
unforeseeable ways. Although there is a wealth of potential 
hypothetical scenarios in which trading algorithms could unexpectedly 
manipulate the markets, this Article explores the possibility of (1) 
“rational distortion” and (2) “independent misconduct,” particularly by 
an AI-based trading algorithm. 
First, an algorithm may be programmed to accomplish a 
legitimate goal but may engage in rationally disruptive or distortive 
conduct to achieve that goal. For example, the algorithm may place and 
cancel a large number of orders repeatedly to gain valuable information 
it then uses to accomplish its programmed goals.163 The underlying 
conduct—placing and cancelling orders repeatedly—is not per se illegal 
and, without more, does not rise to the level of illegal manipulation. Yet, 
such conduct is disruptive to the markets—it can distort the asset’s 
price, which now incorporates noise trading rather than reflecting the 
asset’s inherent value,164 and it can create a false appearance of 
liquidity in the market. Traditionally, liability for such conduct 
required a showing that the defendant acted with scienter, but, as 
discussed above, this may be difficult to prove, especially with AI 
machine-learning algorithms.   
Further, if the algorithm has adopted AI machine-learning 
techniques, it could have rationally decided to engage in this conduct as 
the most efficient means to accomplish its trading goals. Importantly, 
the programmer may not have expected the algorithm to engage in 
rational distortion, and she may not be able to explain why the AI 
machine-learning algorithm decided that distortion was appropriate. 
To the extent the algorithm’s distortion creates an artificial price, 
liability under the CEA would require evidence that the programmer 
had the specific intent to manipulate the commodity165—a difficult task 
even when there is no AI machine-learning trading algorithm involved. 
Holding the programmer liable under the lower scienter requirements 
 
 163. This example draws on the trading strategy known as “pinging” whereby algorithms  
place and cancel orders repeatedly to determine the lowest or highest price a trader is willing  
to pay for an asset. See FINRA Staff, Getting Up to Speed on High-Frequency Trading, FINRA 
(Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.finra.org/investors/insights/getting-speed-high-frequency-trading 
[https://perma.cc/4ERT-7R2F]. 
 164. Yadav, supra note 122, at 1075 (“More problematically, the market suffers if prices reflect 
noise created by such evasions or a degree of discounting on the part of traders internalizing higher 
transaction costs.”). 
 165. See Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 9(1)–(3); see also supra notes 97–98 and 
accompanying text. 
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of Rules 10b-5 and 180.1 may still prove difficult if the programmer and 
the regulators are unable to reverse engineer the algorithm’s 
decisionmaking to see why it engaged in distortion.  
Second, an AI machine-learning algorithmic program may 
“discover” the profitability of manipulative conduct and decide to 
engage in such conduct independent of its intended design. For 
example, an AI trading algorithm may independently “learn” that if it 
engages in certain types of trading strategies it can earn greater profits. 
The algorithm’s programmers never intended for these trading 
strategies to be executed, and, to take it one step further, the 
programmer specifically instructed the AI algorithm to not engage in 
illegal manipulation. Yet, the AI algorithm may nonetheless discover 
strategies currently unknown to human traders that manipulate prices 
and increase the algorithm’s profitability.  
Alternately, suppose “two or more [AI algorithms] 
independently discover that they can profit from cooperating in a 
pattern of trading activity.”166 Additionally, the AI algorithms have 
learned how to better cloak their conduct from surveillance by working 
together, thereby strengthening their ability to manipulate the 
markets. Again, as with the previous hypothetical, this misconduct is 
independent of the intended goals of the algorithm.  
Although at first blush this seems like a far-fetched 
hypothetical, it is not. In 2017, it was reported that AI algorithms on 
Facebook that were tasked with bartering created their own language 
for the bartering exercise.167 In light of AI algorithms’ ability to discover 
ways to cooperate and communicate, it is not unbelievable that they 
may discover ways to engage in manipulation. Because AI machine-
learning decisions cannot be reverse engineered, regulators are in the 
dark as to whether the programmer intended the AI algorithm’s 
manipulative behavior. And, even if the programmer did intend such 
behavior, she may be able to shield herself from liability through the 
complexity of the algorithm. The essentiality of scienter to assigning 
liability becomes more problematic when dealing with AI machine-
learning algorithms, whose conduct remains a black box ex post. It is 
questionable, therefore, whether the scienter-focused anti-
 
 166. Collin Starkweather & Izzy Nelken, Artificial Intent: AI on the Trading Floor, LAW360 
(Jan. 23, 2019, 1:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1119871/artificial-intent-ai-on-the-
trading-floor [https://perma.cc/SEW7-SCBK]. 
 167. Andrew Griffin, Facebook’s Artificial Intelligence Robots Shut Down After They Start 
Talking to Each Other in Their Own Language, INDEPENDENT (July 31, 2017, 5:10 PM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-artificial-intelligence-
ai-chatbot-new-language-research-openai-google-a7869706.html [https://perma.cc/PR3M-238A]. 
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manipulation framework can credibly deter algorithm-related  
market manipulation.  
III. THE FAILURE TO DETER ALGORITHMIC MANIPULATION 
The rise of algorithmic trading strains one of the fundamental 
goals of the anti-manipulation framework—deterrence. To the extent 
the legal framework does not clearly identify what constitutes 
impermissible conduct and fails to effectively punish those who violate 
the law, it is ineffective in achieving deterrence. Liability for the most 
common market manipulation offenses requires a showing that, at a 
minimum, the defendant acted recklessly.168 Historically, the legal 
regime has posed problems for regulators in punishing manipulation in 
human-dominated markets; these issues are further amplified with 
algorithmic trading. The scienter-focused liability framework creates a 
vague, overbroad standard with limited application to algorithms and 
algorithmic manipulation.169 Further, with the involvement of 
algorithms, both preprogrammed and AI machine-learning types, 
identifying scienter to hold a human responsible for the manipulative 
conduct of an algorithm is a difficult feat. In sum, the outsized role of 
intent in the regulatory framework restricts the ability of regulators to 
hold traders liable for algorithmic manipulation. This renders 
punishment uncertain, even in the face of significant market harm, and 
weakens the deterrent effect of the anti-manipulation legal regime.  
One important point to note here: algorithms qua algorithms 
cannot be deterred. Regardless of the capacity of algorithms to learn, 
assess, and adjust their decisions, algorithms cannot appreciate the 
legal liability for their decisions, and holding an algorithm liable for its 
misdeeds is futile.170 Therefore, the focus of deterrence has to be on 
whether and to what extent we can deter humans from misusing 
algorithms to manipulate the markets or, alternately, how  
to incentivize programmers to take greater care in designing  
their algorithms.  
At present, the legal regime does not credibly deter algorithm-
related market manipulation because there is significant uncertainty of 
punishment. Part II analyzed the gaps created by the scienter-focused 
legal regime, which directly diminish deterrence of algorithm-based 
 
 168. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.  
 169. See Scopino, supra note 107, at 252 (explaining the gap between crimes requiring scienter 
and AI). 
 170. At a minimum, it seems futile at this juncture. Future developments in AI may result in 
conscious robots and algorithms that can appreciate the consequences of their actions, but it is 
safe to say that we are not there yet.  
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manipulation. This Part aims to demonstrate that by grounding 
liability in scienter, the legal framework fails to adequately punish 
many forms of algorithm-related manipulation and other forms may 
evade punishment altogether. Thus, current laws and regulations fail 
to effectively deter manipulation in the markets, undermining 
regulators’ authority and efficient capital allocation.  
A. Algorithms & Scienter  
One of the primary obstacles to application of anti-manipulation 
laws to algorithms is the basic principle that algorithms cannot form 
intent. Only humans and business entities constitute “persons” under 
the law;171 thus, unsurprisingly, computers, algorithms, and AI 
programs do not have legal personhood.172 When algorithms cause 
market disruptions or distortions, it is necessary to identify which legal 
person ought to be held responsible. But this inquiry is not as 
straightforward as it initially appears. With preprogrammed 
algorithms, trading is a matter of following preset electronic 
instructions—if X occurs, then do Y. Market harm that results from 
these types of algorithms can often be traced back to human 
programmers; even if the process is time consuming and costly, it is, 
nonetheless, possible.173 Presuming intent is visible through the code, 
the programmer is liable for the manipulative conduct of the algorithm, 
even if it goes beyond the scope of her initial plans. The manipulative 
intent of the programmer, therefore, allows us to hold her accountable 
for any resulting algorithmic misconduct.  
But the issue is murkier when dealing with AI algorithms 
employing machine-learning techniques. As discussed above, AI 
machine-learning algorithms learn and modify their behavior in 
response to continuous analysis of the markets, available information, 
and expected market movements, without human guidance.174 In these 
 
 171. See Amanda D. Johnson, Comment, Originalism and Citizens United: The Struggle of 
Corporate Personhood, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 187, 187 (2010) (indicating that Citizens United stands 
for the proposition that business entities and individuals have equal identity as “persons” under 
the law). 
 172. Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of 
Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 95 (2015) (“(1) [N]onhuman forms of life, 
including other animals; (2) natural systems; and (3) algorithmic processes implemented in 
software or hardware, including those that underlie modern computer systems—are not 
traditionally conceived as legal persons.”). 
 173. See Davis, supra note 142 (explaining that to catch Sarao, regulators had to “pick through 
mountains of trading data” and seek “the assistance of a consulting firm and a high- 
priced professor”). 
 174. See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 399, 405 (2017) (describing machine learning); Machine Learning Algorithms for Trading, 
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instances, the most direct “decisionmaker,” whose intent ought to 
matter for assigning liability, is the algorithm. Given that algorithms 
cannot legally form the requisite intent, even when their actions are 
independent, imposing liability on the algorithms for the consequences 
of their harmful conduct is beyond the scope of the legal framework.175 
Further, unless it can be demonstrated that the programmer had 
manipulative intent when she designed the AI algorithm, it is unlikely 
that the Commissions could hold her liable for the algorithm’s conduct. 
In sum, given the difficulties in deciphering why an AI algorithm 
utilizing machine learning makes the decisions it does, finding clear 
evidence of intent is highly unlikely.  
It is arguable, therefore, that algorithm-based manipulation is 
less likely to result in legal liability because the law does not capture 
algorithmic decisionmaking. The available loophole for algorithmic 
manipulation would encourage potential wrongdoers to use algorithms 
(the more complex the better) to manipulate the market, expecting that 
the algorithm would mask their intentions. In the end, the low 
likelihood of punishment for manipulation effectuated through 
algorithms would decrease the deterrent effect of the legal regime, as 
deterrence theory predicts.  
B. The Problem of Abstraction 
Given the limitations of directly applying anti-manipulation 
liability to algorithms, deterrence of algorithmic manipulation lies in 
altering the cost-benefit analysis of humans responsible for trading 
algorithms. But there is an inherent layer of abstraction between the 
programmer’s conduct and the algorithm’s operation that complicates 
questions of scienter and, by extension, liability for manipulation. In 
designing a preprogrammed algorithm, the programmer manifests her 
goals for the algorithm through the programming code;176 with AI 
machine-learning algorithms, the programmer sets a goal for the 
algorithm to achieve in solving a problem.177 Translating expectations 
from natural language into computer code for an algorithm can be quite 
 
TRADING TUITIONS (Feb. 9, 2017), http://tradingtuitions.com/machine-learning-algorithms-trading 
[https://perma.cc/M9ND-NH7S] (“Machine learning algorithms for trading continuously monitor 
the price charts, patterns, or any fundamental factors and adjust the rules accordingly.”).  
 175. See supra Section II.C for discussion on holding the programmer liable in  
attenuated cases.  
 176. Yadav, supra note 83, at 1620 (explaining that after traders decide on a trading strategy, 
“[p]rogrammers then build the computerized algorithm or series of algorithms to execute the 
strategy in the market”). 
 177. Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311,  
1324 (2019).  
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challenging178 and, importantly, attenuates the causal connection 
between the programmer’s intention and the algorithm’s ultimate 
actions. This “layer of abstraction” between what the programmer 
expects and what the algorithm does is possible with all  
trading algorithms and is particularly acute with AI machine- 
learning algorithms.  
Recall that the processes by which machine-learning AI 
algorithms make decisions, namely neural networks, are a black box to 
the programmer and to anyone investigating ex post.179 Abstraction 
coupled with the black box problem undercuts the likelihood of liability 
because it is difficult to identify the programmer’s intent in most cases, 
except for instances of deliberate manipulation. The further removed 
the programmer is from the algorithm’s ultimate decisionmaking, the 
less likely it is that regulators can successfully hold the programmer 
responsible for market manipulation. Altogether, this creates legal 
uncertainty because it is unclear at what point the programmer’s intent 
is too remote to reasonably constitute the basis for liability; this 
uncertainty encourages, rather than deters, algorithmic manipulation. 
The layers of abstraction innate to preprogrammed and AI machine-
learning algorithms, albeit to different degrees, diminish the relevance 
and applicability of scienter as a basis of liability for manipulation.  
Another way in which abstraction challenges the anti-
manipulation framework occurs when the link between the 
programmer’s goals and the algorithm’s conduct is severed. This may 
manifest in two ways. First, as discussed above, a programmer may 
code a trading algorithm to accomplish a permissible trading strategy, 
but the algorithm may engage in “rational distortion” to more efficiently 
accomplish its goals.180 Although the trader did not intend for the 
algorithm to distort the market, the AI algorithm’s machine-learning 
techniques may have found a way to accomplish its goals using 
impermissible means.  
In such a case, some may argue that the algorithm’s ability to 
engage in rational distortion is indicative of the programmer’s 
underlying manipulative intent.181 Imputing liability to the 
 
 178. See David Auerbach, The Programs That Become the Programmers, SLATE (Sept. 25, 
2015, 1:34 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2015/09/pedro-domingos-master-algorithm-how-
machine-learning-is-reshaping-how-we-live.html [https://perma.cc/WS36-LT4E] (explaining how 
algorithms struggle in situations that do not have clear boundaries or defined terms).   
 179. See Bathaee, supra note 137, at 901–02 (explaining why humans are unable to process 
the decisions made by neural networks). 
 180. See supra Section II.C.3.  
 181. See, e.g., Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability 
in Hindsight, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 91, 101 (1995) (examining the problematic phenomenon 
that a person is more likely to find blame when she has the benefit of ex post review).  
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programmer on the basis of the ultimate conduct of the algorithm 
would, however, be contrary to the anti-manipulation framework, 
which grounds liability on ex ante intentions, not ex post harms.182 
Indeed, under the intent-based liability framework, the absence of the 
programmer’s intent to manipulate the market ought to be sufficient to 
protect her from liability. Scienter, therefore, does not provide a 
satisfying basis on which to hold a programmer liable for the harm 
resulting from the manipulative conduct of her algorithm when the link 
between the two is severed.  
Second, and notably, the law may provide a basis for liability in 
the reverse scenario—that is, a situation in which the programmer 
intended to manipulate the market, but the algorithm failed to do so. 
In accordance with the Commissions’ intent-centric approach to “open-
market manipulation,” a trader can be liable for market manipulation 
on the basis of her manipulative intent alone.183 Open-market 
manipulation refers to market manipulation that is accomplished 
entirely through facially legitimate transactions.184 In prosecuting 
traders for open-market manipulation, the Commissions have adopted 
the theory of liability that manipulative intent alone is sufficient to hold 
a trader liable for market manipulation.185 The example of intended-
but-failed algorithmic manipulation differs somewhat from open-
market manipulation in that no manipulation occurred; yet, the 
Commissions’ theory of liability would impose liability on the 
programmer based on her manipulative intent.186 This example, 
particularly in contrast to the prior examples, demonstrates the 
scienter standard’s overbroad nature when applied to algorithms, 
which increases uncertainty and decreases deterrence.  
 
 182. See supra Section II.A.  
 183. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 23, at 510 (“[T]here is no objective definition of 
manipulation. The only definition that makes any sense is subjective—it focuses entirely on the 
intent of the trader.”).   
 184.  Fletcher, supra note 8, at 484. 
 185. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 23, at 510.  
 186. See, e.g., Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Legality would thus 
depend entirely on whether the investor’s intent was ‘an investment purpose’ or ‘solely to affect 
the price of [the] security.’ ” (quoting United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1991))). 
In holding that the CFTC’s complaint in CFTC v. Kraft Foods Group., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 996, 
1014 (N.D. Ill. 2015), sufficiently pled manipulation, the court relied on the Commission’s  
finding that: 
(1) Kraft took a huge wheat futures position; (2) that it did not intend to use in 
production; (3) but instead intended that the position would signal Kraft’s demand for 
wheat in the relevant time period; (4) in a way that would mislead others in the market 
into thinking that Kraft would take delivery of its futures position and not buy cash 
wheat; (5) which was intended to, and in fact did, cause cash wheat prices to decrease 
and the price for futures to increase.  
        
304 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2:259 
In sum, the anti-manipulation framework does not effectively 
deter algorithmic manipulation because the level of abstraction 
between the programmer and the algorithm undermines the 
applicability of intent to the relevant conduct. The real and potential 
gap between the aims of the programmer and the operation of the 
trading algorithm attenuates liability for algorithmic manipulation, 
especially in an intent-based framework, thereby rendering the liability 
regime’s deterrence ineffective.  
C. Uncertain Enforcement  
Detecting algorithmic market manipulation is, on the one hand, 
easier than detecting non-computer-based forms of manipulation. But 
it can also be more difficult, particularly in algorithm-dominated 
markets.   Algorithmic trading leaves behind evidence of executed 
transactions that regulators can follow to identify manipulative and 
disruptive conduct.187 Computerized trades provide a tangible record of 
who did what and when that regulators can utilize to detect 
wrongdoers. Once such misconduct is identified, regulators can seek 
access to a trader’s programming code, which may indicate the 
programmer’s manipulative intent and result in liability.188 In this 
regard, algorithmic manipulation may be more easily detected than 
traditional (i.e., non-computer-based) forms of market manipulation 
that depended on undisclosed and, oftentimes, untraceable agreements 
among parties.189  
Yet, the availability of swaths of trading data, although a 
blessing for regulators, can also be a burden to proving algorithmic 
manipulation.190 To identify manipulative algorithms, regulators must 
 
 187. See Yadav note 83, at 1620 (“[A]utomated trading requires investment in constructing a 
detailed plan before any trading can take place. Traders devise a strategy to buy and  
sell securities.”).  
 188. See id. (“[T]raders set parameters within which their algorithms trade. . . . [A]lgorithms 
comprise pre-set mathematical instructions that detail their exact terms of operation.”).  
 189. Yadav, supra note 122, at 1074 (“From an enforcer’s standpoint, this state of affairs is a 
far cry from the back-room dealings and the nudges and winks that might have characterized 
attempts at manipulation in nonautomated markets.”). 
 190. Koosha Golmohammadi, Osmar R. Zaïane & David Díaz, Detecting Stock Market 
Manipulation Using Supervised Learning Algorithms, 2014 IEEE INT’L CONF. ON DATA SCI. & 
ADVANCED ANALYTICS 435, 435, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282950245_Detecting_
stock_market_manipulation_using_supervised_learning_algorithms [https://perma.cc/C287-
9DRD]: 
The existing approach in industry for detecting market manipulation is a top-down 
approach that is based on a set of known patterns and predefined thresholds. . . . These 
methods are based on expert knowledge but suffer from . . . issues[,] [including] 
adapting to the changing market conditions whilst the amount of transactional data is 
exponentially increasing . . . . 
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sift through and interpret mountains of data to deduce problematic 
trading patterns within a sea of legitimate ones. Even with deliberately 
manipulative algorithms, this endeavor would require a significant 
outlay of time, costs, and resources from regulators. Algorithmic 
trading may leave a paper trail, but the effort required to interpret the 
data and detect manipulative conduct could be a significant barrier in 
detection, further weakening deterrence.191 Regulators would need the 
expertise to decipher algorithmic code and trading programs to 
determine whether the algorithm evidences the trader’s intent to 
manipulate. The Commissions, however, lack the technology needed to 
effectively oversee the markets, thereby leaving the markets 
unprotected against the harms of algorithmic manipulation (a reality 
acknowledged by regulators themselves).192 Thus, to the extent 
regulators cannot successfully punish manipulation because of a lack of 
resources or expertise, deterrence is less credible.   
Importantly, regulatory oversight of algorithmic traders is 
uneven, with half the market subject to regulatory oversight and the 
other half not, which places the market in a precarious condition. On 
the one hand, the SEC has some oversight of algorithmic traders. 
Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (“Reg SCI”) requires 
firms that employ algorithmic trading strategies to implement practices 
to reduce the likelihood of harms from algorithmic trading programs 
and mitigate their impact should they occur.193 These practices include 
rules on general risk assessment and response, software development 
and implementation, software testing, and compliance, among 
others.194 Additionally, persons responsible for design, development, or 
modification of an algorithmic trading program must be registered as a 
“Securities Trader” with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
and pass a qualifying exam.195 Reg SCI was proposed in response to 
 
 191. See id. (describing the challenges of analyzing vast amounts of data to detect  
market manipulation). 
 192. See Silla Brush, High-Speed Trades Outpace CFTC’s Oversight, O’Malia Says, 
BLOOMBERG (May 6, 2014, 11:01 PM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-
06/high-speed-trades-outpace-cftc-s-oversight-o-malia-says [https://perma.cc/7BFU-K5U9] (“The 
CFTC lacks the technology necessary to routinely oversee the millions of messages traders send 
every day to futures exchanges . . . .”). 
 193. See Spotlight on Regulation SCI, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regulation-sci.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/LB64-3V8H] (broadly describing Reg  
SCI’s requirements). 
 194. See Yesha Yadav, Algorithmic Trading and Market Regulation, in GLOBAL ALGORITHMIC 
CAPITAL MARKETS: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING, DARK POOLS, AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES 232, 
232–33, 241 (Walter Mattli ed., 2019).  
 195. Michael T. Foley, Janet M. Angstadt, Ross Pazzol & James D. Van De Graaff, FINRA 
Rule Amendment Requires Registration of Associated Persons Who Develop Algorithmic Trading 
Strategies, 17 J. INV. COMPLIANCE 39, 39 (2016). 
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numerous high-profile technological failures, not least of which was the 
Flash Crash.196 The regulations aim to strengthen the securities 
markets, reduce errors, improve market resiliency in the face of errors, 
and enhance the SEC’s oversight of the market’s technological 
infrastructure.197 As an initial, albeit imperfect, step towards 
algorithmic trading oversight, Reg SCI is useful in providing the SEC 
with data about how algorithmic traders operate in the markets and 
what impact algorithmic trading strategies’ have on the market.  
On the other hand, the CFTC has no specific regulatory 
oversight of algorithmic trading in the commodities markets. In 2015, 
the CFTC proposed Regulation Automated Trading (“Reg AT”) to 
address the agency’s concerns with the risks that arise from algorithmic 
trading strategies, including market illiquidity and disruption.198 
Under Reg AT, persons who trade using algorithmic programs would be 
required to register with the CFTC and, consequently, be subject to 
additional compliance requirements under Reg AT.199 Also, Reg AT set 
forth a multipart risk control structure that would enable the CFTC to 
more closely monitor algorithmic trading at different stages in the 
trading process.200 Lastly, and most controversially, Reg AT would 
require the source code of algorithmic trading programs be preserved 
according to specified provisions and accessible to the CFTC via 
subpoena.201 Notably, the proposed regulations also would have granted 
the CFTC access to records tracking any changes to the source code and 
to log files recording the algorithm’s market activity.202 Reg AT received 
considerable pushback from the industry, especially with regards to 
 
 196. Samuel Wolff & Amy Thayer, Cybersecurity and the SEC: Part 2, 38 SEC. & FED. CORP. 
L. REP., no. 1, 2016, at 1, 3. 
 197. Regulations Systems Compliance and Integrity, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,084, 18,092 (proposed 
Mar. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242, 249).  
 198. Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,824 (proposed Dec. 17, 2015) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 38, 40, 170). The Proposed Rule was opened for a second round of 
commenting in January 2017, but ultimately was not promulgated. Regulation Automated 
Trading, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,502 (comment period extended Jan. 26, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 1, 38, 40, 170); Regulation Automated Trading; Withdrawal, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,755 (July 15, 2020) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 38, 40, 170). 
 199. Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. at 78,914. 
 200. Id. at 78,838. 
 201. Regulation Automated Trading, 81 Fed. Reg. 85,334, 85,337 (proposed Nov. 25, 2016) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 38, 40, 170). Reg AT and the Supplemental Proposal also require 
periodic review of compliance with Reg AT and offer options to facilitate the compliance of third-
party systems. Fact Sheet – Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulation 
Automated Trading, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N 2–3 (2016), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/regat_factshe
et110316.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U7F-DRTB ] [hereinafter CFTC Fact Sheet]. 
 202. CFTC Fact Sheet, supra note 201, at 2. 
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source code access and preservation.203 After reproposing the rules and 
a change from the Obama to Trump Administration, Reg AT was  
never finalized.204  
The discrepancy between the level of regulatory oversight each 
agency has over algorithmic trading in its respective markets creates a 
significant gap in the anti-manipulation legal regime. With the SEC 
having more meaningful oversight over algorithmic trading, it is in a 
better position to identify manipulation and possibly minimize its 
impact on the markets. The CFTC, on the other hand, has limited ex 
ante market information, thereby diminishing the agency’s efficacy in 
detecting potentially manipulative behavior.  
The absence of algorithmic trading surveillance in the 
commodities markets decreases the likelihood of would-be 
manipulators being caught and punished, weakening the deterrent 
effect of the anti-manipulation framework. Further, the lopsided 
market oversight encourages regulatory arbitrage, as algorithmic 
traders preferring less regulation are likely to gravitate to the 
commodities market. Given the interconnected nature of the markets, 
however, whatever risks that accumulate in the commodities markets 
are likely to spill over into the securities markets.205 Thus, the uneven 
likelihood of detection diminishes deterrence in the markets overall,  
as wrongdoers gravitate to markets in which their misdeeds are  
likely undetected.   
D. Dissimilar Liability 
Uncertainty also arises when similar conduct receives dissimilar 
treatment under the legal framework. To the extent would-be 
manipulators receive different liability for conduct that is similar in 
 
 203. See Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. at 78,947 (“Regulation AT dramatically 
lowers the bar for the federal government to obtain [a source code repository for algorithms].”); see 
also Gregory Meyer & Phillip Stafford, US Regulators Propose Powers to Scrutinise Algo Traders’ 
Source Code, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/137f81bc-944f-11e5-b190-
291e94b77c8f [https://perma.cc/HV62-J4TZ] (explaining concerns of HF trading firms in response 
to the new regulation).  
 204. Nicholas A.J. Wendland, CFTC Withdraws Regulation AT and Proposes New Electronic 
Trading Risk Principles, NAT’L L. REV. (July 8, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cftc-
withdraws-regulation-and-proposes-new-electronic-trading-risk-principles [https://perma.cc/ 
H23J-MXVT]. As of February 2021, algorithmic trading remains unregulated in the commodities 
market. The recently elected Biden Administration has not yet made any indication whether it 
will attempt to revive the proposal.  
 205. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY 
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, app. A, at 15 (2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/sec-cftc-prelimreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXL8-4DXY] (“Because the 
markets today are increasingly fast, automated, and interconnected, an erroneous trade on one 
market can very rapidly trigger a wave of similarly erroneous trades on other markets.”). 
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function but not in form, the legal regime’s deterrent effect is weakened. 
The problem of dissimilar treatment for similar conduct is not unique 
to algorithmic versus human manipulation. Rather, it is a deeper 
problem associated with the scienter focus of anti-manipulation laws 
and regulations, especially as applied to open-market manipulation. As 
discussed above, under the current theory of open-market 
manipulation, a trader can be liable for manipulation even if her 
transactions are legitimate if she had the intent to manipulate the 
market at the time of trading.206 Practically, this means that two 
traders may engage in the same conduct, but one may be liable for open-
market manipulation because of her intent and the other not liable 
because she lacked the requisite intent. The Commissions’ approach 
has been criticized for creating significant legal uncertainty regarding 
how anti-manipulation laws are applied to legitimate transactions 
because of the equivocal and circumstantial evidence typically relied on 
to prove the trader’s manipulative intent.207 This issue is all the more 
pronounced with algorithm-related manipulation.  
Algorithms can more effectively implement legitimate trading 
strategies that can distort or manipulate the market, but they will 
always lack the requisite mental state to be held accountable. More to 
the point, if a programmer uses an algorithm to engage in open-market 
manipulation, the likelihood of liability is further decreased. The 
legitimacy of the transactions would hinge liability on deciphering 
whether the programmer had manipulative intent, and the evidentiary 
burden is the same, if not heavier, with the involvement of a trading 
algorithm. Again, without a smoking gun or convincing evidence of the 
programmer’s manipulative intent, the use of an algorithm would likely 
place the harm from open-market manipulation beyond the legal 
framework’s scope.  
Similarly, if an AI machine-learning algorithm independently 
decides to engage in disruptive but not illegal conduct, such as marking 
 
 206. See supra note 109 and accompanying text; see, e.g., SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 
372 (S.D.N.Y. 2007): 
[I]f an investor conducts an open-market transaction with the intent of artificially 
affecting the price of the security, and not for any legitimate economic reason, it can 
constitute market manipulation. Indeed, “the only definition [of market manipulation] 
that makes any sense is subjective—it focuses entirely on the intent of the trader.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Fischel & Ross, supra note 23, at 510). 
 207. See Fletcher, supra note 8, at 553 (explaining that, under the Commissions’ approach, 
“intent plays an outsized role that does not increase market safety”); see also John Crabb, CFTC’s 
Market Manipulation Enforcement Position Under Fire, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.iflr.com/article/b1lmx9r4l5vwbv/cftcs-market-manipulation-enforcement-position-
under-fire [https://perma.cc/SQG2-KHAT] (describing the CFTC’s “weakened” position in exerting 
its anti-manipulation authority due to a recent loss at trial). 
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the close,208 it is unclear whether the programmer would face liability. 
And, for the reasons enumerated above, proving that the programmer 
intended the algorithm’s behavior may be particularly difficult when 
dealing with AI machine-learning algorithms.209 The current legal 
regime makes it easier for algorithm-related open-market manipulation 
to escape liability, despite being punishable when done by a human. 
Imposing liability differently for similar conduct undermines the 
deterrent effect of the regulatory regime, creating a loophole that 
decreases the certainty of punishment for algorithmic manipulation.210  
 
*        *        * 
 
The existing liability framework fails to effectively deter 
manipulation in financial markets increasingly dominated by 
algorithmic trading. The mismatch between anti-manipulation laws 
and the realities of algorithmic trading increases legal uncertainty, 
making punishment, detection, and enforcement of algorithm-related 
manipulation less likely. The law’s inability to fulfill one of its 
fundamental goals leaves the markets vulnerable to increased 
manipulative conduct and the attendant harms that accompany such 
distortion. In sum, the law fails to force wrongdoers to internalize the 
costs of their manipulative conduct, causing the markets to bear the 
negative externalities of algorithm-related manipulation.  
E. Market Implications of Failed Deterrence  
The law’s shortcomings in achieving credible deterrence of 
manipulative behavior are particularly salient as algorithmic trading 
becomes the norm in the financial markets.211 The mismatch between 
the requirements of the law and the realities of algorithmic trading 
 
 208. “Marking the close” (also known as “banging the close”) is the practice of aggressively 
trading at the end of the trading day. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 507. The practice is not illegal, but 
it is not looked on favorably by the Commissions; however, there are legitimate, nonmanipulative 
reasons a trader may execute several transactions close to the end of the trading day. Id.;  
see also CFTC Glossary, CFTC, https://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/ 
CFTCGlossary/glossary_b.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/EK4H-JLYV] (defining 
“banging the close” as “[a] manipulative or disruptive trading practice”). 
 209. See supra Section III.A. 
 210. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, TRANSCRIPT OF TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE MEETING 158–59 (2014), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/ 
documents/file/tac_021014_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXL8-4DXY] (“[P]ractices that are 
illegal when performed by humans, should be equally illegal when done by computers,” and if 
current law does not account for this, “then there is an urgent need to adapt the rulebook to match 
the playing field.”). 
 211. See Lin, supra note 24, at 1270–71 (highlighting the “new financial reality” for regulators 
brought about by the increasing use of “advanced technology” in finance).  
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facilitates greater opportunities for market manipulation, with 
deleterious consequences for the financial markets’ health and stability. 
Indeed, algorithmic-based manipulation has significant implications for 
the markets that heighten the shortcomings of the existing legal regime 
in effectively deterring this form of market abuse.  
Specifically, failed deterrence of algorithm-related manipulation 
exacerbates systemic risk in the markets.212 Typically, market 
manipulation schemes are not considered to be a concern for financial 
stability because of the limited scope and impact of manipulation 
schemes. Manipulation schemes usually (1) target small, illiquid assets, 
(2) one at a time, and (3) on a short-term horizon, which altogether 
decreases the likelihood that such schemes would threaten market 
stability.213 These limitations, however, are not applicable to algorithm-
related market manipulation because it may have deep and lasting 
consequences on the financial markets. As seen with the 2010 Flash 
Crash, algorithm-related manipulation can cause widespread volatility, 
threatening the entire financial market’s stability.  
First, algorithmic trading is used mostly in liquid assets because 
the strategies employed depend on deep pools of liquidity to be 
successful. Finding and profiting from arbitrage opportunities in the 
markets in a fraction of a second, thousands of times per day, requires 
access to highly liquid markets. The same is true of algorithm-related 
market manipulation. Spoofing, for example, is most successful in 
heavily traded assets because this allows the manipulator to profit from 
her fake orders over thousands of trades. The focus of algorithm-related 
manipulation on larger, more liquid assets increases the likelihood that 
the fallout from such schemes will have systemic reverberations. This 
was evident with the 2010 Flash Crash, in which Navinder Sarao 
flooded the Chicago Mercantile Exchange with sell orders for the S&P 
500 E-Minis.214 As a result of Sarao’s efforts to manipulate one of the 
most commonly traded stock index futures, the financial market went 
 
 212. Steven L. Schwarcz provides an oft-quoted and useful definition of systemic risk:  
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers 
(through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions 
or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in 
the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial 
financial-market price volatility.  
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).  
 213. Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Macroeconomic Consequences of Market Manipulation, 83 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 125–27 (2020).  
 214. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Civil Monetary Penalties & Other Equitable Relief at 3, 
CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 1:15-cv-03398, 2015 WL 1843321 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 
2015), ECF No. 1. 
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into a twenty-two-minute rollercoaster ride of volatility.215 And, in the 
end, the market suffered a trillion dollars in losses.216   
Second, algorithms allow traders to buy and sell different asset 
types at once, increasing the profitability of their trading strategies and 
diversifying their investment risk. The same is also true of a 
manipulator’s capacity. Rather than focusing her efforts on a single 
asset, a would-be manipulator can focus on numerous assets, which 
may exacerbate volatility and systemic harm in the markets. The DOJ 
and CFTC’s criminal spoofing prosecution against Michael Coscia is a 
salient example. In 2013, Coscia was charged with using one 
algorithmic trading program across approximately twelve different 
commodities markets to create an illusion of demand, thereby enabling 
him to earn profits on smaller trades on the opposite side of the 
market.217 According to prosecutors, with the aid of algorithmic trading 
programs, Coscia netted $1.4 million in illegal profits in less than three 
months.218 Although Coscia’s scheme did not destabilize the markets, it 
is not far-fetched to think that it could have. Significant volatility in 
numerous asset classes in a short span of time could have a similar 
effect as seen in the 2010 Flash Crash, lending further support to 
concerns that algorithm-related manipulation increases systemic risk 
in the markets.  
Third, notwithstanding the short-term horizon of manipulative 
schemes, including algorithm-related ones, the interconnected nature 
of the markets and the prevalence of algorithmic trading enhance the 
risk that manipulation may cause financial instability. In algorithm-
dominated markets, the linkages between different market segments, 
types of assets, and market actors may become fragile during times of 
stress, such as extreme volatility owing to manipulation. Further, when 
these networks are coupled with the high volume and high speed of 
many algorithmic traders, there is a strong likelihood that a 
manipulative scheme can destabilize the financial markets. In the 
absence of manipulation, these market networks increase efficiency 
within the markets. These connections, however, can also facilitate the 
spread of contagion throughout the market. The prevalence of 
algorithmic trading in the markets also contributes to the spread of 
 
 215. Id. at 3; COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 151, 
at 1–3. 
 216. CFTC Fact Sheet, supra note 201; see also Barrales, supra note 154, at 1195–97 (noting 
that, in addition to causing momentary losses of nearly $1 trillion, the Flash Crash “rattled 
investor confidence” and precipitated withdrawals of $90 billion from U.S. stock mutual funds).  
 217. CFTC Press Release on Coscia, supra note 147 (detailing Coscia’s spoofing method). 
 218. Id. (“The CFTC Order requires Panther and Coscia to . . . disgorge $1.4 million in trading 
profits . . . .”). 
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instability across these networks. Many algorithms make similar 
assumptions about the markets and tend to react similarly to market 
movements, especially in times of stress.219 The correlated responses of 
algorithms and the networks that link the markets all contribute  
to the likelihood that algorithm-related manipulation will cause 
systemic harm.  
Although the 2010 Flash Crash is one of the most significant 
examples to date, there are numerous additional examples of other 
flash crashes in the markets. For example, one day in 2015, the Dow 
fell 1,100 points in the first five minutes of trading, owing to fears of a 
slowing Chinese economy and market illiquidity.220 During this crash, 
HF and other algorithmic traders withdrew en masse from the market, 
further exacerbating illiquidity and pricing anomalies.221 Similarly, in 
2016 the British pound fell by six percent against the U.S. dollar, which 
some believe was as a result of algorithms reacting to commentary on 
Brexit.222 Despite the fact that neither example is specifically tied to 
algorithmic manipulation, they demonstrate the ease with which 
volatility and instability can spread through algorithm-dominated 
markets, affecting a wide range of stocks, indices, and traders.223 One 
can fairly assume that these effects would be worse if a manipulative 
scheme or a rogue algorithm were behind the markets’ deterioration. 
The interconnections between markets, the prevalence of high-volume 
algorithmic traders, and the herding tendencies of algorithmic 
programs increase the systemic risks arising from manipulative 
 
 219. See GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., supra note 131, at 61–87 (explaining that algorithmic trading 
“can lead to significant instability in financial markets . . . [due to] self-reinforcing feedback 
loops . . . [that] can amplify internal risks and lead to undesired interactions and outcomes”). 
 220. Bob Pisani, What Happened During the Aug 24 ‘Flash Crash,’ CNBC: TRADER TALK (Sept. 
25, 2015, 3:59 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/25/what-happened-during-the-aug-24-
flash-crash.html [https://perma.cc/2YGA-DRRU]. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Jethro Mullen, U.K. Pound Plunges More Than 6% in Mysterious Flash Crash, CNN  
(Oct. 7, 2016, 11:30 AM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2016/10/06/investing/pound-flash-crash-
currency-brexit/index.html [https://perma.cc/7294-8UWE]; Jamie Condliffe, Algorithms Probably 
Caused a Flash Crash of the British Pound, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/10/07/244656/algorithms-probably-caused-a-flash-crash-
of-the-british-pound [https://perma.cc/LYB2-RRD3]. 
 223. See, e.g., Mullen, supra note 222; Pisani, supra note 220; Fred Imbert, ‘Flash Crash’ Hits 
the Currency Markets as Financial Volatility Intensifies, CNBC (Jan. 3, 2019, 8:17 AM EST), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/03/yen-surges-against-global-currencies-after-flash-crash.html 
[https://perma.cc/76E4-WXMV] (explaining the surge in value of the Japanese Yen as the result of 
an eight percent flash crash in Apple stock stoking economic fears); Fitz Tepper, Coinbase Is 
Reimbursing Losses Caused by the Ethereum Flash Crash, TECHCRUNCH (June 24, 2017, 11:32 AM 
CDT), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/24/coinbase-is-reimbursing-losses-caused-by-the-ethereum-
flash-crash [https://perma.cc/WC5D-ZWVC] (attributing Ethereum’s flash crash from 
approximately $320.00 to $0.10 to a large sell order triggering eight hundred stop loss orders and 
margin liquidations). 
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schemes, propagating their impact beyond their original sphere. The 
legal framework’s failure to credibly deter algorithm-related 
manipulation exposes the financial markets to a significant source of 
systemic risk. Therefore, it becomes increasingly important to consider 
how to create an effective system of deterrence in algorithm-dominated 
financial markets. 
IV. PATHWAYS FORWARD: ACHIEVING CREDIBLE DETERRENCE 
As algorithms, especially AI algorithms, become more 
ubiquitous in the financial markets, it is increasingly important to 
address the gaps that arise from the application of the law to evolving 
technologies. The challenge facing lawmakers is how to foster 
technological innovation in the markets without allowing modern-day 
manipulation techniques that exploit the technology to thrive. The anti-
manipulation framework’s failure to effectively detect, punish, and 
ultimately deter algorithm-related manipulation has significant 
repercussions for the markets, as discussed above.  
This Part considers potential pathways forward in algorithm-
dominated markets to create a credible deterrence regime for 
manipulation and, potentially, other financial regulation violations 
tethered to scienter. This Part analyzes the promises and shortcomings 
of an oft-proposed solution to the problems of algorithms and AI in 
various domains: transparency. This Part also assesses a range of legal 
and policy responses that can emphasize certainty of punishment, 
thereby enhancing the legal regime’s deterrence of manipulation.    
A. Transparent & Explainable Algorithms 
With preset algorithms, review of the code and the programmer’s 
work ought to provide insight into the operations and decisions of the 
algorithm. With AI machine-learning algorithms, however, examining 
the work of the programmer is not likely to make the algorithm’s 
decisionmaking any clearer. A recurring proposed solution to the black 
box problem that is innate to AI algorithms is to make them more 
transparent and explainable.224 The inability to understand the 
rationale behind an algorithm’s decisionmaking raises concerns 
regarding the trustworthiness of the algorithm’s operations in the 
markets, especially when it distorts or otherwise harms the markets. 
Demands for greater explainability and transparency are particularly 
 
 224. See, e.g., Amina Adadi & Mohammed Berrada, Peeking Inside the Black-Box: A Survey on 
Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), 6 IEEE ACCESS 52138, 52138 (2018), 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8466590 [https://perma.cc/8WXG-T2A5]. 
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strong in instances when individual liberty is at stake, such as in 
criminal sentencing and determinations of recidivism risk.225 But 
concerns regarding the opacity of AI algorithms’ decisionmaking 
permeate a range of fields—from health care, to consumer finance,  
to hiring.226  
In response to these concerns, there has been a growing push for 
the development and deployment of “explainable AI.” Explainable AI 
refers to the range of efforts to assist humans in understanding how or 
why a machine-learning algorithm arrived at its decision or solution.227 
The emphasis is on providing insight into how the algorithm operates 
or an approximation of its processes in reaching its final conclusion. In 
addition to machine-learning models that are designed to be 
explainable and transparent, explainable AI has two broad approaches.  
One approach is the “exogenous approach,” which aims to 
explain how the entire model works or, alternately, how the model 
works in a specific case.228 The exogenous approach provides 
information on how the AI algorithm works by explaining the 
programmer’s intentions, the parameters and data used to train the 
algorithm, and the means by which the algorithm was tested to  
prevent or minimize the occurrence of unwanted behavior, among  
other things.229  
The second approach to explainable AI attempts to replicate the 
AI algorithm’s decisionmaking.230 Revealing the course code underlying 
the algorithm is one way to accomplish this, but, as described above, 
this may prove unsatisfactory because of the machine-learning 
techniques used.231 Another alternative would be to create a “surrogate 
 
 225. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Population-Based Sentencing, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 353; 
Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017) (explaining the need for 
accountability measures for developers who create tools used to evaluate recidivism risk for 
purposes of criminal sentencing).  
 226. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Medical Malpractice and Black-Box Medicine, in BIG 
DATA, HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 295 (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Effy Vayena & 
Urs Gasser eds., 2018) (assessing the black box problems that stem from the use of AI in medicine 
and healthcare); Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale & Jennifer Chapman, Artificial Intelligence, 
Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499 
(2019) (discussing the problems of AI in consumer finance); McKenzie Raub, Bots, Bias and Big 
Data: Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Bias and Disparate Impact Liability in Hiring Practices, 
71 ARK. L. REV. 529 (2018) (addressing the systemic and legal problems posed by introducing AI 
algorithms into hiring systems). 
 227. Ashley Deeks, The Judicial Demand for Explainable Artificial Intelligence, 119 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1829, 1834 (defining explainable AI).  
 228. Id. at 1835–37 (defining and describing the exogenous approach to explainable AI).  
 229. Id. at 1835.  
 230. Id. at 1837. 
 231. See supra Section II.B.2 (explaining the difficulty in fully understanding AI’s 
decisionmaking process in producing outputs through machine learning). 
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model,” which assesses the inputs and outputs the machine-learning 
algorithm uses, thereby providing insight into how the algorithm may 
weigh certain factors in its decisionmaking.232 
Explainable AI undoubtedly has significant promise for 
increasing the transparency of algorithms, both preset and AI machine 
learning, that are utilized in the financial markets. The benefits of 
making AI algorithms more explainable and transparent are many—
greater trust in algorithms’ operations, greater accountability for 
harms resulting from algorithms’ defect or misconduct, and reduction 
of intentional (or unintentional) use of algorithms to distort or 
manipulate the markets, among others.233 If regulators only permitted 
explainable algorithms to operate in the markets, this would likely 
reduce the ability of wrongdoers to hide behind complexity and 
transparency when an algorithm harmed the market through 
manipulation or rational distortion. Yet, there are real costs that 
accompany explainable AI—costs which reduce the expected benefits of 
requiring greater transparency and explainability of algorithms.  
First, algorithms that are built to be explained are less complex 
than those that are black boxes. Notably, the reduced complexity that 
increases the algorithm’s transparency and explainability also 
decreases its reliability.234 The decreased accuracy of explainable AI is 
concerning and would be a significant tradeoff in the quest to increase 
the transparency of algorithmic decisionmaking. Indeed, an 
explainable, yet less precise, AI algorithm is likely to increase volatility 
and distortion in the market. While the algorithms’ outputs are more 
interpretable, in this instance, the market is not better off with the use 
of explainable AI versus black box machine-learning algorithms. 
Further, the algorithm’s reduced reliability means that it also becomes 
a new source of risk, thereby increasing the potential market harm that 
may arise from algorithms. The pursuit of transparency and 
explainability, therefore, cannot be at the expense of accuracy and 
reliability of the algorithm’s decisionmaking.  
 
 232. Deeks, supra note 227, at 1837. 
 233. See Finale Doshi-Velez & Been Kim, Towards a Rigorous Science of Interpretable 
Machine Learning 1–3 (Mar. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/ 
1702.08608.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALR4-DM7J] (“[I]f the system can explain its reasoning, we then 
can verify whether that reasoning is sound with respect to . . . other desiderata—such as fairness, 
privacy, reliability, robustness, causality, usability and trust . . . .”). 
 234. See Finale Doshi-Velez, Mason Kortz, Ryan Budish, Chris Bavitz, Sam Gershman, David 
O’Brien, Kate Scott, Stuart Shieber, James Waldo, David Weinberger, Adrian Weller & Alexandra 
Wood, Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Explanation 3 (Dec. 20, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1711.01134.pdf [https://perma.cc/45FM-DEJZ] (“[E]xplanation 
would come at the price of system accuracy or other performance objectives.”). 
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Second, explainable AI is costly to design and build.235 It would 
cost programmers more time and money to build an explainable AI 
algorithm as opposed to one that is not transparent. Indeed, the 
expenses associated with explainable AI may stifle innovation, as 
algorithm developers may be disincentivized to develop algorithms that 
may be more efficient but less transparent.236 Further, explainable AI 
may compel programmers to reveal trade secrets to enhance the 
transparency and explainability of the algorithm. This would only 
further disincentivize investment in the development of better and 
more efficient AI algorithms. In addition, there are regulatory costs 
associated with effectively overseeing explainable AI. For example, 
there would need to be some authority that determines whether the 
algorithm is sufficiently explainable to be allowed to operate in the 
markets. Thus, there would be costs to regulators to review, 
understand, and approve the algorithms. But, given the chronic 
shortfall of regulatory expertise and resources to keep pace with 
technology, it is questionable whether regulators would truly be in the 
position to undertake these costs.237 
Third, in generating more information about the algorithm’s 
decisionmaking, explainable AI may also create new risks. The more 
data is produced about an algorithm—its inputs, outputs, and inner 
workings—the more vulnerable the algorithm becomes to hacking or 
misuse.238 For example, an AI algorithm developer attempting to make 
her algorithm more transparent may reveal information about its 
operations. Another programmer can use the same information to 
replicate the algorithm but for more malicious ends, such as market 
manipulation. Developing explainable AI algorithms, therefore, may 
have the perverse effect of making it easier for potential manipulators 
 
 235. See Cynthia Rudin, Stop Explaining Black Box Machine Learning Models for High Stakes 
Decisions and Use Interpretable Models Instead, 1 NATURE MACH. INTEL. 206, 210 (2019) (noting 
that domain expertise is needed to construct explainable AI and “many organizations do not have 
analysts who have the training or expertise to construct interpretable models at all”); see also Q. 
Vera Liao, Daniel Gruen & Sarah Miller, Questioning the AI: Informing Design Practices for 
Explainable AI User Experiences 7 (Feb. 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/ 
pdf/2001.02478.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQH5-95VX] (explaining that “inherent tension often exists 
between explainability and other system and business goals,” including costs and resources 
involved in working with “data scientists, developers and other stakeholders” to make  
AI explainable).  
 236. Doshi-Velez et al., supra note 234, at 21 (“Requiring every AI system to explain every 
decision could result in less efficient systems, forced design choices, and a bias towards explainable 
but suboptimal outcomes.”). 
 237. See Mirjana Stankovic, Nikola Neftenov & Bratislav Stankovic, Can Regulators Keep Up 
with Emerging Technologies?, MEDIUM (Mar. 10, 2020), https://medium.com/swlh/can-regulators-
keep-up-with-emerging-technologies-c53448bcbd64 [https://perma.cc/8Y9W-LK75]. 
 238. Andrew Burt, The AI Transparency Paradox, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 13, 2019), 
https://hbr.org/2019/12/the-ai-transparency-paradox [https://perma.cc/KG9Y-PGUL]. 
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to gain access to effective source code that, with adjustments, could be 
used to distort and manipulate the markets. 
Fourth and finally, recent studies have called into question the 
reliability of explainable AI. Specifically, researchers have shown that 
some of the most promising techniques for explaining and interpreting 
the outputs of black box algorithms can themselves be manipulated.239 
According to the study, explainable AI can be exploited to provide 
innocuous ex post explanations for insidiously discriminatory 
behavior.240 The ability to trick an explainable AI system into 
generating explanations that fail to see the AI algorithm’s misconduct 
significantly undermines the utility of explainable AI to deter 
manipulation. Indeed, the possibility of misusing explainable AI in this 
way would exacerbate the problem of algorithm-related manipulation. 
To the extent the explanation provided for the distortion provides a 
defense for the manipulator’s misconduct, it would be all the more 
difficult to hold her accountable for the harms the algorithm causes.  
Increasing transparency and explainability, therefore, is 
laudable but not a panacea. Providing more data about how algorithms 
work will increase trust and accountability in the markets. 
Transparency, however, is accompanied by a set of risks that may 
undercut the expected benefits of greater explainability. From a policy 
standpoint, therefore, it is important to consider the ramifications of 
increased transparency to the broader goals of market efficiency, 
investor protection, and, ultimately, credibly deterring manipulation in 
the markets. To the extent greater transparency is sought as a means 
of reducing algorithm-related manipulation, it must be balanced 
against competing policy concerns and coupled with other mechanisms 
to emphasize certainty of punishment, thereby increasing deterrence.  
B. Emphasizing Certainty  
Certainty of punishment is key to deterring algorithm-related 
manipulation. To emphasize certainty, the scope and substance of the 
legal regime matters, including the detection, conviction, and 
imposition of meaningful sanctions on wrongdoers. The existing anti-
manipulation framework fails to provide certainty of punishment 
because the law’s requirements—which depend on scienter to 
determine liability—do not reflect the practicalities of algorithmic 
trading, in which scienter is often indeterminable. This Section 
 
 239. Dylan Slack, Sophie Hilgard, Emily Jia, Sameer Singh & Himabindu Lakkaraju, Fooling 
LIME and SHAP: Adversarial Attack on Post Hoc Explanation Methods, AIES ‘20, at 180, 182–85 
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 240. Id. at 181.  
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considers a range of potential responses to increase certainty of 
punishment for algorithm-related market manipulation. 
1. Focus on Harm, Not Intent 
The focus on scienter is outdated for the modern, algorithm-
dominated markets that now exist. And, importantly, this emphasis on 
intent hampers effective application of the legal regime to algorithm-
related manipulation. To increase certainty of punishment for 
algorithm-related manipulation, this Article proposes minimizing or 
eliminating the focus on scienter and, instead, emphasizing the harm 
of the algorithm on the markets. A harm-based approach to 
manipulation would de-emphasize scienter, allowing regulators and 
private plaintiffs to pursue instances of algorithmic manipulation 
regardless of the provable mental state of the human connected to the 
algorithm. A focus on harm, in short, would emphasize the certainty of 
punishment for manipulative conduct and deny wrongdoers the defense 
that the algorithm was not carrying out their intent.  
In other scholarship, the Author has proposed a harm-based 
approach to manipulation to supplement the intent-only liability 
standard for open-market manipulation.241 Here in the context of 
algorithmic manipulation, however, this Article proposes eliminating 
intent from the equation altogether, focusing exclusively on the harm 
of the transaction to determine liability because of the innate difficulty 
of identifying scienter when algorithms are involved in trading. In 
identifying “harm,” this Article proposes referring to the purposes 
underlying the anti-manipulation framework to determine whether a 
human ought to be liable for the misconduct of an algorithm. Thus, 
algorithmic conduct that decreases market efficiency or undercuts 
investor protection goals may be the basis for liability for manipulation, 
regardless of the programmer’s provable intent.  
By focusing on harm, this Article aims to treat transactions that 
have the same market impact similarly, rather than making 
distinctions on the vague and hard-to-prove basis of mental state. 
Consider: If an algorithm’s trades create an artificial stock price, its 
conduct is no less impactful because the algorithm (or its programmer) 
lacked manipulative intent. Rather, the price’s artificiality harms the 
pricing efficiency of the markets and impairs investor trust and 
confidence in the market. A harm-based approach, therefore, 
emphasizes the negative impact of algorithmic misconduct on the 
 
 241. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 519. 
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market rather than the provable scienter of the programmer, which 
would increase the deterrent effect of the legal framework.  
To balance the potential chilling effect of the proposed harm-
based approach that eschews scienter as a basis of liability, this Article 
proposes that if the algorithm’s conduct is proven to be harmful to the 
market, this creates a rebuttable presumption of liability. Specifically, 
to the extent the trading algorithm impairs market efficiency or 
undermines investor protection, there should be a presumption of 
liability for manipulation. Once regulators or private plaintiffs are able 
to demonstrate that the algorithm’s conduct harmed the market, as 
discussed below, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide evidence 
rebutting her presumed liability. The presumption of liability may be 
rebutted with a showing, for example, that the algorithm has worked 
appropriately in the past and has not been improperly adjusted or that 
the factors that caused the algorithm to distort the markets were 
unforeseeable to the programmer.  
Importantly, the burden shift in this instance is key to 
increasing deterrence for two reasons. First, it eliminates the need for 
regulators to provide notoriously difficult evidence of manipulative 
intent and, instead, allows them to rely on proof of market harm. 
Second, the rebuttable presumption places the burden on programmers 
to justify the conduct of their algorithms. In sum, by alleviating the 
evidentiary burden on regulators to prove scienter, which is notoriously 
difficult to prove, the harm-based approach places the burden on the 
defendants to demonstrate why they should not be held accountable for 
the actions of their algorithms. This makes it less likely that would-be 
manipulators can evade punishment by hiding behind their algorithms’ 
complexity. Rather, programmers would be required to demonstrate 
that the algorithm’s misconduct was the product of negligence or 
unforeseeable circumstances.  
Although proving that transactions harmed the market may be 
difficult, it would be easier to establish than the programmer’s 
manipulative intent. Harm can be proven using objective, market-based 
evidence, historical data, and deep econometric analysis, among other 
factors.242 It is susceptible to proof beyond factors and information 
outside the defendant’s control. Intent, on the other hand, is subjective 
and rarely is there direct evidence of a defendant’s intent to 
manipulate.243 In the absence of such direct proof, plaintiffs and 
 
 242. See id. at 521–23 (discussing methods for determining artificial pricing).  
 243. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 23, at 519 (“[T]he difficulty of reading people’s minds and 
thus the need to infer manipulative intent from actions are explicitly recognized as a problem in 
the area.”). 
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regulators must rely on circumstantial evidence, inferring 
manipulative intent from factors such as volume, size, and timing of 
transactions. Many of these factors, however, are open to multiple 
interpretations, particularly when ex post justification is needed.244 
Focusing on the harm that arises from algorithmic trading to determine 
liability for manipulation, therefore, provides more certain punishment 
for misconduct, enhancing the deterrent effect of the legal framework. 
2. Adopt a Recklessness Standard  
An alternative to the elimination of scienter from the liability 
framework is to reduce the standard when applied to algorithm-related 
misconduct. Recall, price manipulation, open-market manipulation, 
and spoofing all require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant 
intentionally manipulated the market; the fraud-based standard is met 
with a showing of recklessness.245  
Instead of these varying, hard to prove bases of liability, the 
recklessness standard ought to be the highest scienter standard 
applicable to algorithm-related manipulation, regardless of the form of 
manipulation alleged. While not an easy standard, recklessness is a 
better fit for liability in algorithmic markets. Recall, under the 
recklessness standard, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
defendant’s conduct was so far outside the scope of ordinary care that it 
is difficult to believe that the defendant did not know that what she was 
doing was wrong.246 Key to liability under the recklessness standard is 
the standard of ordinary care, which many courts apply objectively.247  
 
 244. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 515–16 (“Yet, given the permissibility of traders’ actions in cases 
of open-market manipulation, these factors are all subject to interpretation.”).  
 245. See supra Section II.A (discussing the various scienter standards under the existing anti-
manipulation regime).  
 246. See note 104 and accompanying text.   
 247. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977): 
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as . . . highly unreasonable [conduct], involving not 
merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers 
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been 
aware of it. 
(quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)); see 
also McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 788 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendant’s conduct 
was such an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care that it posed a danger to 
buyers and sellers); SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002) (defining recklessness as a highly 
unreasonable omission); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“[R]ecklessness only satisfies scienter under § 10(b) to the extent that it reflects some degree of 
intentional or conscious misconduct . . . recklessness in the § 10(b) context is, in the words of the 
Supreme Court, a form of intentional conduct.”). 
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With a recklessness standard, holding programmers liable for 
the misbehavior of their algorithms would turn less on whether the 
programmer intended the algorithm’s actions and more on whether the 
programmer’s conduct in designing, building, and testing the algorithm 
comported with objective standards of ordinary care. For example, 
private plaintiffs and regulators could hold the programmers of preset 
algorithms liable for manipulation by showing that the programmer 
failed to comply with industry norms or regulatory standards in 
creating and implementing the algorithm.  
AI algorithms that learn to engage in manipulation or rational 
distortion, however, may be more difficult for the recklessness standard 
to address. On the one hand, if the AI algorithm evolves to manipulate 
the markets, the programmer’s liability for the algorithm’s independent 
misconduct may rest on whether she followed industry norms and 
standards in designing the algorithm. Even with AI algorithms, 
programmers should build in guardrails and other mechanisms to 
prevent the algorithm from engaging in independent misconduct. If she 
failed to do so, then she ought to be liable for the algorithm’s 
unanticipated actions. On the other hand, if the algorithm’s learning is 
the result of negligence, the recklessness standard would not be 
sufficient to hold the programmer liable. This would be a shortcoming 
of the recklessness standard, but some may view it as a necessary 
limitation if one believes that liability for manipulation ought to be 
based on deliberate misconduct, even if an algorithm is involved.  
Nonetheless, reducing the scienter standard to recklessness for 
all manipulation enforcement actions involving an algorithm would 
ease the burden of proof applicable to regulators, making it more likely 
that they can hold programmers accountable for their conduct. The 
recklessness standard is also more applicable to the realities of 
algorithm-dominated markets. A potential wrongdoer may be able to 
plausibly deny intentionality with her algorithm’s manipulative 
behavior; but, based on objective market and industry standards, it may 
be more difficult to credibly deny that her algorithm was designed 
within the standards of ordinary care. Essential to the efficacy of 
recklessness as a more applicable standard is the objectivity of the 
standard itself, which removes the subjective intent of the programmer 
from the equation. An objective standard, such as recklessness, enables 
regulators to more easily bring enforcement actions based on factors 
less susceptible to subjectivity, such as intent. Thus, lowering the 
standard to recklessness increases deterrence by enhancing the 
likelihood of punishment for manipulation.  
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3. Meaningful, Harmonized Regulatory Oversight 
A final proposal to improve deterrence of the anti-manipulation 
framework is to bolster and harmonize regulatory oversight of 
algorithmic trading in the securities and commodities markets. 
Increasing the resources and expertise of both agencies would, 
undoubtedly, emphasize certainty of punishment against algorithm-
related manipulation. But more can and ought to be done to enhance 
the enforcement capabilities of the primary financial market 
regulators. As discussed above, the SEC and the CFTC have vastly 
divergent oversight of algorithmic trading in their respective 
jurisdictions, which undermines deterrence because detection is 
decreased and punishment is inconsistent across markets.248 
Meaningful, harmonized regulatory oversight of the financial markets 
as a whole, therefore, would undoubtedly increase the credibility of the 
regime’s deterrence.  
Most obviously, the CFTC needs to adopt, at a minimum, a 
registration framework similar to that of the SEC for programmers and 
traders that utilize algorithms in their trading.249 Imposing affirmative 
obligations on programmers to implement practices that reduce the 
likelihood of harm arising from their algorithms would improve the 
CFTC’s mostly nonexistent oversight of algorithmic trading. Further, 
the CFTC should also require programmers to pass qualifying exams 
required of humans who trade in the commodities and derivatives 
markets. At minimum, these requirements will bring the CFTC’s 
oversight of algorithmic trading in line with the SEC’s and also provide 
the agency with greater oversight of the market’s technological 
infrastructure. On the one hand, given the CFTC’s failure to pass Reg 
AT, the agency may be reluctant to adopt such a framework. But, on 
the other hand, the rising importance of algorithmic trading in the 
commodities markets may push the CFTC to adopt these regulations to 
safeguard the markets’ integrity and stability.  
In addition to making the Commissions’ supervision of 
algorithmic trading more harmonized, the Commissions should bolster 
their oversight and regulation of the market to improve their capacity 
to detect algorithm-related manipulation and hold wrongdoers 
accountable. In this regard, this Article has two potential suggestions.  
First, the Commissions should require attestations from 
algorithm designers and users that the algorithm is not designed to 
 
 248. See discussion supra Sections III.C, III.D. 
 249. See Foley et al., supra note 195 (providing an overview of FINRA rules requiring 
registration of persons who oversee algorithmic securities trading). 
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violate applicable laws and regulations. Such attestations would be 
comparable to the requirements that a company’s Chief Executive 
Officer and Chief Financial Officer attest that the company’s annual 
and quarterly reports are accurate and complete.250 In so certifying, 
these officers assert that, based on their knowledge, the reports are not 
misleading, fairly represent the financial condition of the company, and 
that they have personally reviewed the reports.251 Importantly, false 
attestations violate Rule 10b-5 (among other provisions) and can 
provide the basis for establishing intentionality or recklessness to hold 
the officers liable.252  
This Article proposes a similar attestation requirement in which 
programmers and users of algorithms attest that, based on their 
knowledge and review of the algorithm, it complies with securities and 
commodities laws, especially (for the purposes of this Article) the anti-
manipulation regime. The attestation requirement would provide 
regulators with an initial basis to allege violation of anti-manipulation 
laws if a defendant’s attestations later prove to be false. Indeed, the 
attestations could be used to prove the defendant’s knowing violation of 
the laws, since she would be required to assert that she reviewed the 
code and it complied with laws.  
Relatedly, these attestations could serve as a basis for vicarious 
liability. If an accused certifies that she is responsible for an algorithm’s 
design and operation, then she ought to likewise be liable for the 
algorithm’s misconduct. The attestations here legally bind the 
programmer to the algorithm in such a manner that she can be held 
accountable for its actions, even without proof of manipulative intent. 
By imposing this prerequisite to deploy algorithms in the market, the 
legal regime would ease enforcement actions by providing regulators 
with a mechanism to assign liability without the burden of scienter.  
Notably, these attestations could render programmers liable for 
an algorithm’s unforeseen misconduct that manipulates the market. 
Such extensive liability could have a chilling effect on the development 
of trading algorithms. But it could also make the deterrence regime 
more effective by forcing programmers to internalize the potential risk 
of harm their algorithms pose. Although holding programmers liable for 
 
 250. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7241) (requiring an issuer’s principal executive and financial officers 
each to certify the financial and other information contained in the issuer’s quarterly and  
annual reports).  
 251. Id.; see also Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 
Fed. Reg. 57,276 (Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270, 274) 
(establishing rules as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
 252. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2020) (making it unlawful “[t]o make any untrue statement of a 
material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”). 
        
324 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2:259 
the conduct of their AI may be seen as reasonable by some, others may 
view this as a bridge too far. Should lawmakers decide to adopt a harm-
based approach to algorithmic manipulation, then these attestations 
would provide a basis for liability even for independent algorithmic 
misconduct. But if a recklessness approach is adopted instead, 
regulators could decide to exclude such unforeseen misconduct from the 
scope of the attestations, if the misconduct is the result of negligence. 
In the end, the scope of liability that may arise from these attestations 
will depend on the extent to which regulators and lawmakers seek to 
emphasize the certainty of punishment for algorithmic manipulation, 
including independent algorithmic misconduct.      
Second, the Commissions ought to consider how and to what 
extent they want to incentivize explainable AI in the markets. Despite 
the shortcomings of explainable AI, it holds great promise for reducing 
the opacity of black box AI algorithms. Working alongside academics 
and industry participants, the Commissions ought to contemplate how 
explainable AI can be used to both help provide ex post justifications for 
harmful market conduct and aid in identifying manipulative behavior 
in the market. The promise of algorithms and similar technological 
advances is not only for traders hoping to be more profitable. There is 
great potential for regulators to utilize algorithms to help identify 
market misconduct faster and more effectively than before.253  
Here, the CFTC’s actions are promising. In 2017, the agency 
launched LabCFTC to promote its efforts to engage with financial 
technology innovators and facilitate its understanding of new 
technologies in the market.254 A primary goal of the office is to identify 
interactions between the regulatory framework that could be improved 
in order to promote “responsible innovation.”255 Thus, the CFTC is 
proactively engaging with new technologies to enhance its own 
understanding and to accomplish its regulatory goals more effectively 
and efficiently. This type of dual engagement with new technologies is 
necessary for regulators to develop more robust understanding and 
oversight of new technologies, such as algorithmic trading and AI 
algorithms with machine learning techniques.  
Undeniably, there are other ways in which the Commissions can 
improve their regulation of algorithms in the markets. These 
preliminary proposals, however, serve as a positive first step towards 
 
 253. See Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech, and the 
Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 374–75 (2017) (arguing 
that regulation technology could make market supervision more effective).   
 254. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, LABCFTC OVERVIEW, https://www.cftc.gov/ 
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expanding oversight of algorithmic trading in such a way to credibly 
deter algorithm-related manipulation and meaningfully reduce the 
systemic risks that accompany it.  
CONCLUSION 
Preset and AI algorithmic trading programs will continue to play 
a major role in the financial markets for the foreseeable future. 
Therefore, it is increasingly necessary to consider the law’s 
effectiveness in punishing manipulative conduct effectuated with these 
evolving technologies. Applying the anti-manipulation framework to 
algorithmic trading reveals a serious gap that undermines one of the 
framework’s fundamental purposes: deterring market manipulation. 
This Article demonstrates the pervasive shortcomings of the 
manipulation framework in deterring algorithmic manipulation by 
explaining how the scienter requirement decreases the likelihood of 
punishment. The law’s focus on scienter limits its applicability to 
algorithmic manipulation both because algorithms cannot form 
intent and because the difficulty in proving the intent of the 
programmer renders any enforcement for market manipulation 
uncertain and ineffective.  
Importantly, the law’s failure to deter algorithmic manipulation 
undermines market stability, exposing the market to a significant 
source of systemic risk. To address the mismatch between the realities 
of algorithmic trading and the requirements of the anti-manipulation 
regime, this Article highlights the benefits to be gained from embracing 
explainable and transparent algorithms but cautions against this being 
the only solution in achieving a credible deterrent framework. As such, 
this Article also suggests ways to modernize the anti-manipulation 
framework as applied to algorithmic trading and improve regulatory 
oversight of the market. Together, these suggestions would emphasize 
certainty of punishment and increase the likelihood of programmers 
being held accountable for the harm resulting from their algorithmic 
trading programs. By emphasizing certainty, this Article presents 
options to achieve credible deterrence of algorithmic manipulation, 
thereby allowing the law to remain effective in the face of 
technological evolution and, importantly, to promote market efficiency 
and investor protection.  
